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A DECADE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: 1942-1951
Bernard Schwartz*
Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt of New Jersey was
visiting England before the last war, he found that English
lawyers often took with them on their summer vacations a book called
the Annual Survey of English Law. These volumes, which summarized legal developments during the year covered, were a covenient
means to enable the English bar to keep up with changes in the different fields of law. The war put an end to the English series with the
1940 issue, but, back in the United States, Judge Vanderbilt, the then
newly appointed Dean of the New York University School of Law,
furnished the impetus for the inauguration of the Annual Survey of
American Law, with the volume covering 1942.
With the publication during the past year of the 1951 volume, it is
now ten years since the Annual Survey of American Law first began to
appear. The decade covered by the Survey has been a highly significant
one in the history of American law. "Pearl Harbor," as Judge Vanderbilt pointed out in his Foreword to the first of the Survey volumes,
"marked as definite a transition in American life as the Declaration of
Independence or the election of Abraham Lincoln. The year 1942 thus
becomes a convenient starting point for comparing the old era and the
new."1 The ten years which have gone by since this statement was
made have seen the adaptation of our legal system to the exigencies of
total war, its reconversion with the coming of peace, and its partial remobilization to meet the needs of the "cold war."
The past ten years have been particularly momentous ones in the
development of American administrative law. It is, indeed, not too
much to say that there are few, if any, aspects of that field which have
not witnessed important changes during that time. It is for this reason
that an analysis of administrative law developments during the past
decade should prove useful. However valuable an annual survey of the
law may be, it suffers from the shortness of the period which it covers.
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An analysis of developments during a decade enables a broader perspective to be obtained.
It will be the purpose of this article to present such a ten-year survey of American administrative law. Such a compendium must, of
necessity, concentrate primarily upon federal law. It is hoped, however, that sufficient references to state law are included to preclude
the assumption, which is usually made by students in this field, that
federal administrative law is the only law worth considering on the
subject.
Delegations of Power
Yakus case. By 1942, it had already become obvious that the restrictions which had been imposed in the Panama Re-fining2 and
Schechter cases upon the delegation of legislative power were more
apparent than real. In those cases, the Supreme Court had, for the
first time, invalidated congressional legislation on the ground of undue
delegation. In the six years after the Panama and Schechter decisions
were rendered, however, delegations to government officials or agencies
were uniformly upheld by the federal courts. Though certainly not
as broad in scope as the grants of authority contained in the National
Industrial Recovery Act, these later delegations were sufficiently extensive to lead one observer to conclude, after an analysis of them, that
"the survey of congressional delegations since the Schechter case indicates that if the opinion was intended to raise any substantial barriers
to delegation of legislative power by Congress it has failed to achieve
its goal. . . . Practical necessity seems the only limitation left as far as
delegability is concemed."4
~e federal cases since 1942 have given added force to this conclusion. Perhaps the most important of them has been Yakus v. United
States/' which dealt with the validity of the Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942. Under that statute, the Price Administrator was given the
authority, when, in his judgment, commodity prices rose or threatened
to rise "to an extent or in a manner inconsistent with the purpose"
of the act, to establish "such maximum price or prices as in his judgment will be generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the pur2Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241 (1935).
s Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837 (1935).
4 Nutting, "Congressional Delegations since the Schechter Case," 14 Mxss. L.J. 350
at 366 (1942).
5 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660 (1944).

1953]

AoMINISTRATIVE LAW:

1942-1951

777

poses" of the act. The Court, through Chief Justice Stone, sustained
the statute on the ground that sufficiently precise standards were prescribed to confine the administrator's regulations and orders within
fixed limits. The standards laid down were prescribed in section 2 (a)
of the act, directing the Administrator, "so far as practicable," in
establishing any maximum price, to ascertain and give due consideration to prices prevailing in a specified period in 1941, but permitting
him to use another period because necessary data for that specified
were not available. The act also allowed him to ·"make adjustments
for such relevant factors as he may determine and deem to be of general
applicability," including several factors mentioned. "The standards,"
declared the opinion of the Chief Justice, "... are sufficiently definite
and precise to enable Congress, the courts, and the public to ascertain
whether the Administrator, in fixing the designated prices, has conformed to those standards.... Hence we are unable to find in them an
unauthorized delegation of legislative power." 6
The Court's decision called forth a vigorous dissent by Justice
Roberts, who asserted that the standards laid down in the Price Control
Act were no more definite than those prescribed in the National Industrial Recovery Act. "Reflection will demonstrate," said he, "that in
fact the Act sets no limits upon the discretion or judgment of the
Administrator. His commission is to take any action with respect to
prices which he believes will preserve what he deems a sound economy
during the emergency and prevent what he considers to be a disruption of such a sound economy in the postwar period. His judgment,
founded, as it may be, on his studies and investigations, as well as
other economic data, even though contrary to the great weight of current opinion or authority, is the final touchstone of the validity of his
action." 7 The discretion vested in the Price Administrator was, in
Justice Roberts' view no more canalized within banks that kept it from
overflowing than was that delegated in the Schechter case. Hence,
he concluded, the Yakus case "leaves no doubt that the [Schechter]
decision is now overruled."8
It may well be that Justice Roberts went too far in reaching this
conclusion. The Y akus and Schechter cases appear to be distinguishable, for the Price Control Act was enacted to help meet the emergency
of war. The broad delegation was, therefore, sustainable under the
6Id. at 426.
at 451-452.
Sid. at 452.
7 Id.
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war power. Justice Rutledge pointed this out in his separate dissenting opinion in the Y akus case. The Congress, said he, clearly possessed
the substantive authority to establish nation-wide price control in war
time. "As it is with substantive control, so it is with delegating legislative power. War begets necessities for this, as for imposing substantive
controls, not required by the lesser exigencies of more normal periods.
In this respect certainly there is as much room for difference as exists
when Congress is dealing wholly with internal matters and when it is
acting with the President about foreign affairs....9 Not only the broader power of Congress, but its conjunction in the particular delegation
with the wider authority of the President, both as chief magistrate and
as commander-in-chief, goes to sustain the greater delegation."10
One would, however, have to be particularly hardy to state with
assurance that the decision in the Y akus case was based solely upon
the existence of the war emergency. Nowhere in his opinion did
Chief Justice Stone differentiate the case before him from the ordinary
case of peacetime delegation. On the contrary, as Justice Roberts
pointed out, "the reasoning and the authorities cited seem to indicate
that the delegation would be good in peacetime and in respect of peacetime adrninistration."11 It is thus difficult to state the exact effect of
the Y akus decision upon the doctrine of the Schechter case. The
two cases are, as has been pointed out, distinguishable upon the basis
of the need to meet the exigencies of war in Y akus. But the Court
did not choose to base its decision upon that distinction. Perhaps all
one can do is to conclude, as did Chief Justice Vanderbilt, "Although
opinions may differ as to whether the Schechter decision is dead, there
can be little doubt that its force has been greatly weakened at least for
the time being."12

Standards. The federal cases since Y akus indicate clearly the
extent to which the judicial pendulum has swung in the past ten years
with regard to delegations of power. In the first place, as the Y akus
case itself, and even the decisions before it, show, our courts today
refuse to invalidate legislation merely because it, in form, delegates
legislative power to administrative authorities. The approach to the
delegation problem has shifted from one of formal application of an
9 Citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216
(1936).
10 321 U.S. 414 at 462.
11 Id. at 460.
121944 AmrnAL StmVEY ol' AMI!mCAN LAw 174.
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inflexible maxim against delegations of legislative power to one of
determining whether the legislative grant of authority is in fact inordinate. And with this, the focus of judicial inquiry has centered
upon the adequacy of the standards contained in enabling legislation.
Under American theory, grants of authority to the executive branch
must be limited by prescribed standards. The discretion conferred
must not be so wide that it is impossible to discern its limits. There
must be an ascertainable legislative intent to which the exercise of the
delegated power must conform. To this extent only is there meaning
in the maxim against delegation-that delegation must not amount to
an abdication of the legislative function.
Recent federal statutes generally make use of broad, general standards rather than prescriptions of detail. It has been felt that, if the
legislature were required to specify with minute particularity the course
to be followed by the administration, much of the advantage of delegation would be lost. The attitude of the Supreme Court toward this
type of statute can be seen from several of its recent decisions. In
Lichter 11. United States,13 petitioners claimed that the Renegotiation
Act unlawfully attempted to delegate legislative power. That law provided for the renegotiation of war contracts and authorized administrative officers to recover profits which they determined to be "excessive."
But the act did not define the term "excessive profits" other than to
state that it "means any amount of a contract or subcontract price
which is found as a result of renegotiation to represent excessive
profits"-which, as one commentator has pointed out, is to define the
term by saying, in effect, that excessive means excessive.14
Despite this lack of specificity, the Court upheld the act. "It is
not necessary," said Justice Burton, "that Congress supply administrative officials with a specific formula for their guidance in a field where
flexibility and the adaptation of the congressional policy to infinitely
variable conditions constitute the essence of the program. . . . The
statutory term 'excessive profits,' in its context, was a sufficient expression of legislative policy and standards to render it constitutional."1 "
It may well be that, as in the Y akus case, the Court was led to sustain what has been termed "what is in some respects the greatest delegation upheld by the Supreme Court"16 by the fact that the law at issue
1s334 U.S. 742, 68 S.Ct. 1294 (1948).
14DAVIS, ADMINisTRAnVIl LAw 49 (1951).
15 334 U.S. 742 at 785, 783 (italics omitted).
16 DAVIS, ADMINisTRAnvE LAw 49 (1951).
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was enacted to deal with the war emergency. Justice Burton was
manifestly influenced by the fact that the challenged authority was
"essential to an effective use of its war powers by Congress."17 "In
time of crisis," he declared, "nothing could be more tragic and less
expressive of the intent of the people than so to construe their
Constitution that by its own terms it would substantially hinder rather
than help them· in defending their national safety."18
The fact that they may rest primarily upon the war power makes
it difficult to assess the true effect of cases like Y akus and Lichter
upon the law concerning delegation. Though they imply a relaxation
in the requirement of defined standards, they can readily be distinguished from the normal peacetime case, if the Court chooses to do
so. Yet a number of such "normal" cases appear to show that, even in
statutes not related to the war power, the standards canalizing delegations of authority to administrative officials need not be any more
detailed than those contained in the laws upheld in the Y akus and
Lichter cases.
Under section 5 (d) of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board was empowered to prescribe by
regulation the terms and conditions upon which a conservator may
be appointed for a federal savings and loan association. The district
court had held that this constituted an invalid delegation, in that no
criterion was established to guide the Board in its exercise of the
authority conferred.10 The Supreme Court candidly conceded that
there was no express legislative standard. But that did not lead it to
declare the law at issue invalid. "It may be," said Justice Jackson,
"that explicit standards in the Home Owners' Loan Act would have
been a desirable assurance of responsible administration. But the provisions of the statute under attack are not penal provisions. . . . The
provisions are regulatory.... A discretion to make regulations to guide
supervisory action in such matters may be constitutionally permissible
while it might not be allowable to authorize creation of new crimes
in unchartered fields." 20
334 U.S. 742 at 779.
at 780. The war power was also relied upon to sustain delegations in United
States v. Shoreline Cooperative Apartments, 338 U.S. 897, 70 S.Ct. 248 (1949) and
Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 68 S.Ct. 421 (1948).
19 Mallonee v. Fahey, (D.C. Cal. 1946) 68 F. Supp. 418 at 420.
20Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 at 250, 67 S.Ct. 1552 (1947).
11

18 Id.
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With the Court's explicit recognition that standards are not necessary in a law of this type should be compared its opinions dealing with
grants of power under the Communications Act of 1934. Under that
act, the Federal Communications Commission is given wide authority
to regulate radio broadcasting. "The Commission was, however, not
left at large in performing this duty. The touchstone provided by
Congress was the 'public interest, convenience or necessity,' a criterion
which 'is as concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a
field of delegated authority permit.' " 21 In a field where the subject
matter of regulation is as fluid and dynamic as radio, a detailed prescription of standards could have made effective administration impossible.
Congress would have frustrated "the purposes for which the Communications Act of 1934 was brought into being by attempting an
itemized catalogue of the specific manifestations of the general problems, for the solution of which it was establishing a regulatory agency.
That would have stereotyped the powers of the Commission to specific
details, in regulating a field of enterprise the dominant characteristic
of which was the dominant pace of its unfolding."22
But where does this leave the requirement of an ascertained standard in enabling legislation? Plainly, a standard such as that contained
in the Communications Act is not mechanical or self-defining; it
implies wide areas of judgment and, therefore, of discretion. 23 If such
a broad standard is considered adequate then has not the requirement
of a defined standard become a purely formal one and, if that is the
case, has not the American law, in practice if not in theory, become
similar to that in Britain, where there are no constitutional limitations
to restrain Parliament from delegating authority how it will?
The Supreme Court would answer this by asserting that the
generality of the phrasing in a statute, such as the Communications
Act of 1934, does not mean that the applicable standards are too vague
to canalize administrative discretion effectively. The statutory
language is not to be read in a vacuum; a general standard may be given
specific form and content when looked at in the light of the statutory
scheme and its background. Thus the standard of "public interest" in
21National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 at 216, 63 S.Ct. 997
(1943).
22 Id. at 219. The most recent example of the Court's attitude is contained in Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Refining Co., 338 U.S. 604, 70 S.Ct. 405 (1950).
2a 338 U.S. 604 at 611.
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the Communications Act is not so vague and indefinite as to be unconstitutional. "It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general
reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determination. The purpose of the Act, the requirements it imposes, and the
context of the provision in question, show the contrary."24
One wonders, however, whether a standard such as that contained
in the. Communications Act really furnishes an effective legislative
guide. At it has been put by Professor Davis, "telling the agency to
do what is in the public interest is the practical equivalent of instructing
it: 'Here is the problem. Deal with it.' "25 Certainly a legislative
direction to act in the "public interest'' appears to add little to an enabling act. Would the FCC be likely to act any differently in specific
cases if the Communications Act did not specifically instruct it to be
guided by "public interest, convenience or necessity"? 26
It cannot be denied, in the light of the above, that the attitude of
the federal courts toward the delegation problem has changed substantially since the Panama Refining and Schechter cases. Schechter
may still stand apart because of the tremendous scope of the delegation
at issue there-what has been called the "most sweeping congressional
delegation of all time." 27 But, if standards such as those contained in
the Reorganization and Communications Acts are upheld as adequate,
it becomes apparent that the requirement of standards in the federal
field has become more a matter of form than substance. Provided that
there is no abdication of the congressional function, as there was in the
Schechter case, the enabling law will be upheld, even though the only
standard which the federal courts can find is so broad as to be almost
illusory.
State cases. In the state courts, the requirement of standards has
remained of much greater significance. Though, in the states, too,
grants of authority are not invalidated merely because the standard
laid down by the legislature is general in terms,28 this does not go so
far as to countenance delegations which are not confined by any standard. Two important recent cases will serve to illustrate this.
24 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 at 226, 63 S.Ct. 997
(1943).
25 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 46 (1951).
26 Compare id. at 64.
27Jd. at 53.
2s See, e.g., Ratliff v. Lampton, (Cal. App. 1947) 187 P. (2d) 421, affd. 32 Cal. (2d)
226, 195 P. (2d) 792 (1948).
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In Packer Collegiate Institute v. University of State of New Y ork,29
the New York Court of Appeals held a statute of that state to be unconstitutional as delegating legislative power in violation of the state
constitution. The law at issue provided that no one other than public
school authorities or an established religious group could establish or
maintain a nursery school, kindergarten, or elementary school, unless
the school was registered under regulations prescribed by the Commissioner of Education. The basic weakness of this statutory provision, said the court, was the absence of any standards to control the
power vested in the Commissioner. "The statute before us is nothing
less than an attempt to empower an administrative officer, the State
Commissioner of Education, to register and license, or refuse to register
and license, private schools under regulations to be adopted by him,
with no standards or limitations of any sort. The Legislature has not
only failed to set out standards or tests by which the qualifications of
the schools might be measured, but has not specified, even in most
general terms, what the subject matter of the regulations is to be. . . .
Only. the wildest guessing could give us any idea of what the Legislature had in mind."30 The decision of the New York court should be
contrasted with that of the United States Supreme Court in Fahey v.
Mallonee, 31 which has already been discussed. The statute upheld in
the federal case certainly seems to be as much without any standard
as that condemned in New York.
Another significant state case which shows that the federal approach
to the requirement of standards is not necessarily followed by state
courts is State v. Traffic Telephone Workers' Federation,32 a 1949
decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey. The challenged law
there was one which sought to deal with labor disputes in public
utilities. It provided for seizure by the governor where operation of
a utility was interrupted by a labor dispute. After seizure, all disputed
issues between the utility and its employees were to be submitted to a
specially constituted board of arbitration. The statute then went on
to direct the board to decide the issues submitted to it. But there was
no legislative indication of the factors which were to guide the board
in reaching its decision. The lack of such a statement, said the New
Jersey court, was a deficiency which rendered the law invalid. "If no
20 298
30 Id.

31

N.Y. 184, 81 N.E. (2d) 80 (1948).
189.

at

332 U.S. 245, 67 S.Ct. 1552 (1947).

s2 2 N.J. 335, 66 A. (2d) 616 (1949).
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standards are set up," declared Chief Justice Vanderbilt, "to guide the
administrative agency in the exercise of functions conferred on it by
the legislature, the legislation is void as passing beyond the legitimate
bounds of delegation. . . . Nowhere in this act is there any guide
furnished to the board of arbitration other than that it shall arbitrate
'any and all disputes then existing between the public utility and the
employees.' "33

Investigatory Power
Scope. Exercise of investigatory power is one of the critical points
of modem administrative law.34 "Investigation is in many cases the
first, and in many the only, point of personal contact between an
administrative agency and the person with whom the agency is dealing.
The investigating personnel is more numerous than any other that
comes into contact with the public. Dissatisfaction with the way in
which that personnel performs its duties could thus go far to impair
public confidence in the whole administrative process."35
Because of the significance of the administrative power of investigation and the extent to which it impinges upon the privacy of the
individual citizen, our courts have, in the past, taken a narrow view
toward its permissible scope. In 1908, the Supreme Court rigidly
construed a statute granting investigatory power to the Interstate Commerce Commission. The "power to require testimony," reads the
opinion of Justice Holmes, "is limited, as it usually is in English speaking countries, at least, to only the cases where the sacrifice of privacy is
necessary-those where the investigations concern a specific breach
of the law.''36 And, in his well-known opinion in the American T ohacco case,37 Justice Holmes articulated the judicial hostility toward unrestricted administrative inquiries into private affairs-so-called "fishing expeditions" into the affairs of citizens for the chance that something discreditable might be disclosed. "It is contrary to the first princi33 Id. at 353. The New Jersey law was amended after this decision to include standards to guide the arbitration board. These were held adequate in New Jersey Bell Tel. Co.
v. Communications Workers, 5 N.J. 354, 75 A. (2d) 721 (1950).
34 McFARLAND AND VANDERBILT, CAsEs AND MATEllIALs ON ADMINisTRATiv.E LAw,
2d ed., 84 (1952).
35 BENJAMIN, AnMINisTRATiv.E ADJUDICATION IN NEw YoBK 73 (1942).
36 Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U.S. 407 at 419, 29 S.Ct. 115
(1908).
37 Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 44 S.Ct. 336
(1924).
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ples of justice," declared the learned Justice, "to allow a search through
all the respondents' records relevant or irrelevant in the hope that something will turn up."38
During the past decade, the attitude of our highest tribunal toward
administrative investigatory authority appears to have changed completely.39 In its most recent decision on the subject, indeed, the Court
has gone so far as to imply that the restrictions imposed by Justice
Holmes, discussed above, no longer serve to limit administrative authority in this field. In the case referred to, United States 11. Morton Salt
Co.40 decided in 1950, the Court stated that the investigative function
of an agency like the Federal Trade Commission is wholly different
from that of a court. And the fact that the agency may be engaged in
a "fishing expedition" to see what it can turn up does not render its
action invalid. "Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to
summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues in litigation,"
asserted Justice Jackson, "it does not follow that an administrative
agency ... may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry."41
And, in an analogy fraught with significance, the administrative
power of inquisition was likened "to the Grand Jury, which does not
depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence but can
investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even
just because it wants assurance that it is not."42 If the administration
possesses a power of inquiry like that of the Grand Jury, if its investigations may, like those of that body, be justified by "nothing more than
official curiosity,"43 one wonders whether this does not render meaningless the principles promulgated by Justice Holmes, as restrictions upon
administrative investigatory authority.
Enforcement of subpoenas. The sanction behind the administrative
investigatory power is the authority of the administration to issue subpoenas. The administrative subpoena, as Chief Justice Stone has
pointed out, "is in form an official command, and even though improvidently issued it has some coercive tendency.... The subpoena power
differs materially in these respects from the power to gather data and
make investigations .... Without the subpoena that power is, in effect,
38Jd. at 306. See, similarly, Ellis v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 237 U.S. 434,
35 S.Ct. 645 (1915).
39 See DAVIS, ADMINisTRATIVB LAw 92 (1951).
40 338 U.S. 632, 70 S.Ct. 357 (1950).
41Jd at 642.
42 Ibid.
43 Id. at 652.
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a power of inspection at the employer's place of business to be exercised
only on his consent."44
Because of the fact that the authority to issue subpoenas is capable
of oppressive use,45 the administration has generally not been given the
power directly to enforce its own subpoenas. Indeed, in the celebrated
Brimson case, Justice Harlan, referring to the Interstate Commerce
Commission, went so far as to assert, "Such a body could not, under our
system of government, and consistently with due process of law, be
invested with authority to compel obedience to its orders by a judgment
of fine or imprisonment. "46 Largely because of the Brimson case, Congress has never attempted to confer upon an administrative agency
itself the power to compel obedience to its subpoenas. Instead of authorizing agencies to enforce their subpoenas, Congress has required
them to resort to the courts for enforcement.47
In the Brimson case, the Court held that a judicial proceeding to
enforce an administrative subpoena satisfied the "case or controversy"
requirement of the Federal Constitution and did not violate the separation of powers. Justice Harlan was, however, very careful to state that
judical authority could properly be employed in such a proceeding
since it was not "merely ancillary and advisory." 48 The courts in such
cases were exercising true judicial power and they could consequently
deal with the merits of any defenses which might be raised to enforcement of particular subpoenas. "If there is any legal reason why appellees should not be required to answer the questions put to them, or to
produce the books, papers, etc., demanded of them, their rights can be
recognized and enforced by the court below when it enters upon the
consideration of the merits of the questions presented by the petition."49
1n· one of the most important developments in its recent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has greatly narrowed the range of issues
which may be considered by the courts in proceedings for the enforcement of administrative subpoenas. If Justice Harlan were asked what
legal reasons which might be set up as a defense in the enforcement
proceeding he was referring to in his Brimson opinion, he certainly
would have included among them the defense that the administrative
44 Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357 at 363-364, 62 S.Ct. 651 (1942).
45 Id. at 363.
46Jnterstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 at 485, 14 S.Ct. 1125
(1893).
47Penfield Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 330 U.S. 585 at 603, 67 S.Ct.
918 (1947).
48 154 U.S. 447 at 487.
49 Id. at 489.
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agency was without authority over the person to whom the subpoena
had been issued. For, it is basic in Anglo-American law that the administration may act only within the area of "jurisdiction" marked out
for it by law. If a private citizen does not come within the coverage of
the particular agency's e~abling legislation, the agency is without power
to take any action which affects him.
It was precisely this issue of lack of jurisdiction or coverage that
was raised as a defense in a proceeding to enforce an administrative
subpoena in Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins.'50 That case arose
under the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, which requires those
who contract to furnish materials to the government to meet certain
labor standards. The Secretary of Labor was given investigatory authority to ferret out violations of the act. Petitioner in the instant case
had contracted to supply materials to the government and admitted
an obligation to comply with the act with regard to certain of its plants.
The Secretary had, however, issued a subpoena which sought information relating to plants other than those specified in the contract. In
the subpoena enforcement proceeding, petitioner denied that any work
in performance of the government contracts was done in those plants.
Hence, it asserted, they were beyond the jurisdiction of the Secretary.
This defense was upheld in the district court, but rejected by the
Supreme Court. According to Justice Jackson, who delivered the opinion of the Court, the determination of the issue of coverage was primarily the duty of the Secretary. "Nor was the District Court authorized to decide the question of coverage itself. The evidence sought by
the subpoena was not plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful
purpose of the Secretary, and it was the duty of the District Court to
order its production for the Secretary's consideration."51
If the Endicott Johnson case stood alone, one might well contend
that its principle is limited to cases involving government contractors.
The government contractor is not treated by our administrative law as
one having "rights" which are adversely affected by the administration.
His is a mere "privilege" to contract with the government, which the
latter may grant on any terms it wishes. The Walsh-Healey Law, said
Justice Jackson in the Endicott Johnson case, "is not an Act of general
applicability to industry. It applies only to contractors who voluntarily
enter into competition to obtain government business on terms of
which they are fairly forewarned by inclusion in the contract."52 It
50 317 U.S. 501,
51 Id. at 509.
112 Id. at 507.

63 S.Ct. 339 (1943).
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was this which led Representative Walter to state, in the debate in the
House of Representatives on the bill that became the Administrative
Procedure Act, with regard to its section dealing with subpoenas, that
"the existing constitutional safeguards ... in some cases, such as those
involving public contractors-see Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins
. . ., have been held inapplicable."53
Even at the time this statement was made, the assumption upon
which it was based was no longer valid. For, several months before,
the Supreme Court had rejected the notion that the principle of the
Endicott Johnson case represented an exception to the general rule
applicable to subpoena enforcement proceedings. In Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling, 54 the Court held, on the contrary, that the
principle of Endicott Johnson is one which is generally applicable in
subpoena enforcement cases. The Oklahoma Press case involved a
subpoena issued under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Those subject
to its provisions are certainly not in the subordinate position which
government contractors have in our administrative law. But, said Justice Rutledge, ignoring this distinction, it would be anomalous to hold
that, under the Walsh-Healey Act, the district court was not authorized
to decide the question of coverage, and, at the same time, to reach a
different result here. It is for the Wage and Hour Administrator,
rather than for the courts, in the first instance, to determine the question of coverage. Consequently the defense of lack of statutory jurisdiction cannot be set up in a proceeding to enforce an administrative
subpoena.51s
In speaking of the judicial role in such proceedings, Justice Frankfurter has asserted that, in the discharge of their duty, "courts act as
courts and not as administrative adjuncts. The power of Congress to
impose on courts the duty of enforcing obedience to an administrative subpoena was sustained precisely because courts were not to be
automata carrying out the wishes of the administrative. They were
discharging judicial power with all the implications of the judicial
function in our constitutional scheme."56
53 AI>MINisTRATIVB Pnoc:emn\E Ac:r: LEGISLATIVB HISTORY 363 (1946).
54 327 U.S. 186, 66 S.Ct. 494 (1946).
55 The doctrine of the Endicott Johnson and Oklahoma Press cases is probably

not
changed by section 6(c) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. See D. G. Bland
Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (5th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 555.
56 Penfield Co •. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 330 U.S. 585 at 604, 67 S.Ct.
918 (1947).
.
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If this is true, it is difficult to see why the court in a subpoena enforcement proceeding is now debarred from considering the question
of coverage, upon which the very administrative power to act depends.
As it was expressed by Justice Murphy, dissenting in the Endicott Johnson case, "If petitioner is not subject to the act as to the plants in question, the Secretary has no right to start proceedings or to require production of records with regard to those plants. In other words, there
would be no lawful subject of inquiry, and under present statutes
giving the courts jurisdiction to enforce administrative subpoenas, petitioner is entitled to a judicial determination of this issue before its
privacy is invaded."57
If there is an answer to this argument, it is based upon the assertion that the Endicott Johnson principle is essential, as a practical matter, to effective exercise of administrative investigatory power. The
jurisdictional issue can be raised in every subpoena enforcement proceeding. If the court must try that issue whenever it is set up by way
of defense, it will readily enable those subject to administrative authority unduly to delay investigations into their affairs. To permit the defense to be raised, said Justice Rutledge in the Oklahoma Press case,
"would stop much if not all of investigation in the public interest at the
threshold of inquiry and, in the case of the Administrator, is designed
avowedly to do so. This would render substantially impossible his
effective discharge of the duties of investigation and enforcement which
Congress has placed upon him."58
Administrative Procedure Act
Background. In 1929, the Lord Chief Justice of England descended from Olympus and launched his now-famous attack upon the
'1awlessness" of English Government Departments.59 In this country,
there has been nothing as spectacular as Lord Hewart's New Despotism. This is not to say, however, that the forces working for the
reform of administrative procedure have been less potent here than
they have been on the other side of the Atlantic. If anything, they
have been stronger with us. In England, the movement for administrative procedure reform begins and ends with the Report of the Com57 317 U.S. 501 at 513.
58 327 U.S. 186 at 213.
li9WILLIS, THE PARLIAMENTARY POWERS OF ENGLISH GoVERNMENT DEPAR'l'MI!NTS
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mittee on Ministers' Powers. 60 In this country, the Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, our counterpart of the British Committee, marks only a starting point for efforts
to improve the administrative process.
The Attorney General's Committee issued its Report in 1941. One
of the chief points of difference in that committee arose over the proposal of a minority of its members for a Code of Standards of Fair Administrative Procedure. This was intended to serve as a set of procedural principles to govern- administrative action-a more detailed
legislative formulation of what the Supreme Court has termed the
"fundamentals of fair play."61 "An adequate pattern of procedure
is imperatively needed to serve as a guide to and check upon administrative officials in the exercise of their discretionary powers."62 The
majority among the committee differed from this idea of a complete
and rounded code. The great number and variety of administrative
agencies, in their view, were seen to preclude the adoption of a code
applicable to all.
Both the majority and minority of the committee submitted bills
embodying their views, which were introduced in 1941. That of the
majority sought to give legislative effect to certain basic recommendations which the committee's report had made. That of the minority
was more detailed, but certainly fell short of the particularized code
which the minority's statement of additional views had advocated. A
subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee held exhaustive hearings on the proposed measures, but the gathering storm of national
emergency and war dissipated the interest which the Report of the
Attorney General's Committee had aroused, and the problem of administrative procedure reform was put aside for the moment.63 As Chief
Justice Vanderbilt expressed it in surveying administrative law developments during 1942, "Had it not been for the War, 1942 might well
have been •signalized as a year of great achievement in the movement
for reforming federal administrative procedure.... The War, coming
to the United States at the close of 1941, blocked any prospect of
administrative reform the following year."64
ao Cmd. 4060, 1932.
Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134
at 143, 60 S.Ct. 437 (1940).
.
61

62 REPORT oP 'l'HE ATTORNEY G:eNERAL's CoMMITTllE ON AI>MINisTRAnv:s PRoCE-

215 (1941).
as See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 at 40, 70 S.Ct. 445 (1950).
64 1942 .AmmAI.. StmVBY oP AMmu:CAN LAw 89.
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As the war progressed toward a successful conclusion, and war legislation no longer completely dominated the congressional calendar,
efforts to give legislative effect to the proposals of the Attorney General's Committee were revived. This time, the movement was successful and the result was the Administrative Procedure Act. 64 a Its enactment has been well described by Justice Jackson: "The McCarranSumners bill, which evolved into the present Act, was introduced in
1945. Its consideration and hearing, especially of agency interests,
was painstaking. All administrative agencies were invited to submit
their views in writing. A tentative revised bill was then prepared and
interested parties again were invited to submit criticisms. The Attorney General named representatives of the Department of Justice to
canvass the agencies and report their criticisms, and submitted a favorable report on the bill as finally revised. It passed both Houses without opposition and was signed by President Truman June 11, 1946."611

Provisions. The enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act
must rank as the most significant administrative law development during the past decade. Though that act "has been aptly described as the
most important statute affecting the administration of justice in the
federal field since the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789,"66 its effect
is certainly not a revolutionary one. It is a far cry from the complete
code demanded by the minority of the Attorney General's Committee
and, despite the oft-asserted statement that the act represents the congressional embodiment of the viewpoint of the minority, it appears, in
many ways, to constitute more or less a compromise between the suggestions of the majority and the minority of the Attorney General's
Committee. Instead of being a detailed code, the Administrative Procedure Act is a statement of the basic procedural principles which are
to govern the administrative process. The act's formulation of these
principles is, in large measure, only an adoption of the best existing
administrative practice. What is important, however, is that the act
states the essentials of such practice in statutory form and imposes the
best existing procedure upon the administration as a whole. It is
as the first attempt by the Congress to state the essentials of the procedures to be followed by the administrative process that the Administrative Procedure Act is of moment. Hitherto, the control of admin64a 60 Stat. L. 237, 5 U.S.C. (1946) §§1001 to 1011.
611 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 at 40 (1950).
66 Vanderbilt in the FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
TRATIVE AcBNcms iv (1947).
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istrative procedure has been largely limited to intervention by the
courts, based upon the concept of procedural due process. With the
act of 1946, the federal legislature has now assumed a cardinal role.
The procedural provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
are based primarily upon the distinction between the legislative or
rule-making functions of administrative agencies, on the one hand,
and their judicial or adjudicative activities, on the other. Generally
speaking, the procedure prescribed with regard to rule-making is informal in character, although provision is also made for the comparatively rare case of formal rule-making where the procedure is ·patterned upon that followed in the case of adjudications. The requirements imposed where administrative adjudications are concerned tend
to be more formal in nature, modelled upon the procedure of the
judicial process.
As far as rule-making is concerned, the Administrative Procedure
Act provides for what has been termed a system of antecedent publicity.67 General notice of proposed rule-making is to be published
in the Federal Register. The agency concerned must then afford interested persons the opportunity to participate in the rule-making
through submission of written data, views, or arguments, with or without opportunity to present the same orally, and all relevant matter so
presented is to be considered by the agency. These provisions appear
to be modelled upon those contained in the English Rules Publication
Act, 1893, and constitute a laudable effort to obtain some democratization of the rule-making process without, at the same time, destroying
its B.~xibility by imposing procedural requirements which are too onerous.68
As far as adjudications are concerned, the basic portions of the
Administrative Procedure Act are those establishing a semi-independent
corps of hearing examiners, who are to preside over cases which are not
heard by the agency heads. Their appointment and tenure is placed
under the control of the Civil Service Commission, with the object of
enabling qualified examiners to be chosen and of permitting them to
maintain the independence appropriate to a quasi-judge, by freeing
them from direct agency control. These examiners are given substantial powers at the hearing and in the process of decision. They are
empowered to issue initial decisions, which become the decision of the
agency unless appealed, in cases where the agency does not require (in
67 REJ?oRT oF THE CoMMlTI'EE oN MlmsT.Bns' PoWERs 44.
68 That the requirements of section 4 are not too burdensome is shown by Lansden v.
Hart, (7th Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 409.
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specific cases or by general rule) the entire record to be certified to it
for initial decision. The intent of the act here is to assimilate the roles
of hearing and deciding officers within the agency to those of trial and
appellate courts, though this has been defeated in part by the tendency
of many agencies to provide by general rule that they, rather than the
examiners, shall make the initial decision.69
Even more important than this, however, in defeating the intent of
the draftsmen of the Administrative Procedure Act is what has been
referred to as the ''hearing examiner fiasco" under the act.70 Theimplementation of the provisions of section 11 of that act by the constitution of a corps of competent examiners is the key to the effectiveness
of the formal procedural requirements imposed by the Administrative
Procedure Act. Yet the recent breakdown in the machinery for implementing section 1171 has meant that that section has had little of the
practical effect intended for it. Though the examiner system provided
for by the Administrative Procedure Act was to be operative by June
11, 1947, it is still largely a mere paper system.72 Unless and until
this is remedied, much of the corrective effect which its draftsmen
intended the act to have will not be felt in actual practice.
Judicial reception. A statute is not self-executing. The legislative
ought must run the gauntlet of judicial interpretation before it attains
the practical status of an is. This is true in all legal systems; but it is
especially true in this country, where the courts play so prominent a
constitutional role. The Administrative Procedure Act, like other legislation, would lose much of its practical efficacy if its terms were to be
read by the courts in a decimating spirit.
It was feared by some that the Supreme Court would construe the
act in so restricted a manner that it would lose much of its remedial
effect. The present Court's attitude toward the administrative process
-which, as is well known, is one of marked friendliness, as compared
with that of its predecessors-could well have led it to view with hostility a statute which interfered with administrative procedural autonomy and to interpret it so as to limit its effect whenever possible. The
69 In such cases, it should be noted,
70 Fuchs, "The Hearing Examiner

the examiner makes a recommended decision.
Fiasco under the Administrative Procedure Act,"

63 HAB.v. L. R:sv. 737 (1950).
71 Ibid., for a discussion of the history of the breakdown: McCarran, ''Three Years of
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act-A Study in Legislation," 38 GEO. L.J. 574 at
581 et seq. (1950); Thomas, "The Selection of Federal Hearing Examiners: Pressure
Groups and the Administrative Process," 59 YALE L.J. 431 (1950).
72 McCarran, ''Three Years of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act," 38 GEo.
L.J. 574 at 582 (1950).
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Court has, however, given a clear indication in Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath73 that it does not intend to construe the Administrative Procedure Act in so restricted a manner.
The specific question at issue in the Wong Yang Sung case is one
with which the lower federal courts had been much concerned since
cases involving the Administrative Procedure Act first began to arise.
The basic problem is one of the applicability of the formal procedural
requirements of sections 5, 7, 8, and 11 of the act to specific administrative proceedings. The Wong Yang Sung case involved a proceeding
to deport an alien. In such cases there is no express statutory requirement of a hearing, and the government asserted that, in the absence of
such statutory requirement, the Administrative Procedure Act by its
own terms did not apply. This was true, asserted the government, even
though it has long been recognized that due process requires a hearing
in deportation cases. The "legislative history makes clear that the word
'statute' was used deliberately so as to make Sections 5, 7, and 8 applicable only where the Congress has otherwise specifically required a
hearing to be held." 74 Under this view it is not enough that due process demands a hearing in a particular case for the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act to govern. There must in
addition be some statutory command for a hearing.
The question to be decided here comes down to one of determining
whether the term statute in the Administrative Procedure Act is to be
applied literally with the result of narrowing the applicability of the
act, or whether it can be construed so as to include the concept of due
process, so that its procedural safeguards are to be applicable to the case
of an alien like Wong Yang Sung. The answer to this question depends
in large part upon the attitude of the judge toward the act. Is the act
an unwarranted restriction upon the B.exibility of the administrative
process and as such to be construed as narrowly as possible, or is a
broader approach to be preferred?
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in the Wong Yang Sung case,
the lower federal courts had almost uniformly refused to hold the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act applicable to deportation
proceedings. In the Wong Yang Sung case, however, the Court indicated that the narrow approach is not the way to read remedial legislation such as the Administrative Procedure Act. "It is the plain duty
339 U.S. 33, 70 S.Ct. 445 (1950).
Gmran.AL's M.ANuAL ON
(1947).
73

74ATroRNEY
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of the courts," asserted Justice Jackson in the Wong Yang Sung opinion, "regardless of their views of the wisdom or policy of the act, to
construe this remedial legislation to eliminate, so far as its text permits,
the practices it condemns."75
In holding that deportation hearings had to comply with the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, although there
has never been any statutory direction that hearings be held in deportation cases, Justice Jackson adopted a broad approach to the question
of the applicability of the act. In effect, under the Wong Yang Sung
decision, the procedures prescribed by the Administrative Procedure
Act must be followed in every case where a formal hearing is required
by law in connection with the exercise of an administrative function.
If such a hearing is demanded by due process, as it clearly is in the case
of deportation proceedings, even though it is not required by statute,
the agency concerned must comply with the provisions of the act. In
other words, as stated recently by one of the legislative sponsors of the
act, by the Wong Yang Sung decision, the Administrative Procedure
Act "has survived academic and hair-splitting theories as to the source
and statutory specification of hearing requirements." 76
In two more recent cases, the Supreme Court has indicated that
its decision in the Wong Yang Sung case will be given the widest
possible effect. The first of them, Riss & Co. v. United States, 11 involved a proceeding before the Interstate Commerce Commission on
an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity to
extend operation as a common carrier by motor vehicle under section
207(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act. A hearing was held before an
employee of the Commission's Bureau of Motor Carriers, which was
the branch of the Interstate Commerce Commission which appeared
at the hearing and presented the case in opposition to the granting of
the application. The applicant objected and .filed a petition demanding
that the case be heard before an examiner appointed pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act. The Commission denied the petition
on the ground that the proceeding was not required by statute to be
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing
within the meaning of section 5 of the act.
339 U.S. 33 at 45.
McCanan, ''Three Years of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act," 38 GEo.
574 at 581 (1~50).
77 341 U.S. 907, 71 S.Ct. 620 (1951).
11>
76

L.J.
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The Commission's action was upheld by the district court. 78 Although conceding that there was "implicit'' in the relevant statute a
fundamental requirement that a full and fair opportunity be afforded
applicants to present their side of the case, the court concluded that the
Administrative Procedure Act did not apply because the commission
had discretion to decide the case on policy considerations as well as the
record of the hearing. But this is true of many, if not most, administrative determinations, and the court's decision, if upheld, could well
nigh undermine the efficacy of the Wong Yang Sung case. It was this
which led the Supreme Court to reverse in a one sentence per curiam
opinion, citing only its Wong Yang Sung decision.
The second case before the Supreme Court involving the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act was Cates v. Haderlein.79
It concerned a fraud order issued by the Postmaster General. The
statute which authorizes the Postmaster General to issue postal fraud
orders does not use the term "hearing." It does, however, provide that
the Postmaster General may act "upon evidence satisfactory to him."
Is the obligation imposed upon the Postmaster General tantamount to
a statutory requirement of a ''hearing" within the meaning of section
5 of the Administrative Procedure Act? The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit felt that it was not.80 But the Supreme Court again
reversed per curiam, this time upon the government's confession of
error.
The Riss and Cates cases indicate clearly that the Supreme Court
meant what it said about the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath. It is indeed most unfortunate that the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Post Office
Department did not see fit to acquiesce at once in a decision which
ultimately is in their own best interest. As stated by Chief Justice
Hughes, the maintenance of proper standards on the part of administrative agencies in the performance of their adjudicatory functions "is
of the highest importance and in no way cripples or embarrasses the
exercise of their appropriate authority. On the contrary, it is in their
manifest interest."81
That the Supreme Court has thus indicated that it will give the
fullest possible effect to the applicability provisions of the Adminis1s (D.C. Mo. 1950) 96 F. Supp. 452.
79 342 U.S. 804, 72 S.Ct. 47 (1951).
so (7th Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 369.
81 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 at 22, 58 S.Ct. 773 (1938).
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trative Procedure Act does not of itself mean that that statute applies
in every case in which the evils it was aimed at appear. For the Congress has indicated that it does not intend fully to give effect to its own
purpose in 1946 in passing an act to apply uniformly to the entire
administrative process. Thus, soon after the Wong Yang Sung decision,
a rider was inserted in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1951,
providing that deportation proceedings were henceforth to be without
regard to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. 81 a And
similar exemption for particular agencies from the requirements of the
act is contained in roughly a score of statutes enacted since 1946. The
Senate Judiciary Committee has stated: "The successive granting of exemptions to certain administrative operations from the terms of the act
serves only to chip away the framework of what was intended to be a
uniform structure of safeguards for the citizen in his dealings with Federal administrative agencies."82 The argument of emergency which is
usually made in favor of specific exemptions is surely invalid here. To
the administrator, the execution of his policy always presents elements of
emergency. The Administrative Procedure Act itself was most carefully
drafted and its many saving clauses appear to take care of genuine
emergency requirements.88

State developments. It should not be thought, from the foregoing,
that the movement for procedural reform in administrative law has
been confined to the federal field. The states, too, are becoming
increasingly active. There have been several state reports comparable
to that of the Attorney General's Committee, of which the most notable
has been the Benjamin Report on administrative adjudication in New
York. 84 But the most significant development has been the enactment
in a number of states of legislation analogous to the federal Administrative Procedure Act. Much of the impetus here, as in the federal
81a The constitutionality of this provision has recently been upheld. Belizaro v. Zimmerman, (3d Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 282.
82 Quoted in Pike & Fisher, Ad. Law, Release, Aug. 27, 1951.
83 S. 1770, 82d Cong., 1st sess., was introduced in 1951 to eliminate most of the
exemptions from the APA. It passed the Senate and was reported out by the House
Judiciary Committee, but was not acted upon by the House itself while the 82nd Congress
was in session.
84 BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE 011 NEw YoRK (1942).
Among the more elaborate state reports are the TENTH BrBNNIAL REPORT TO THE GovERNOR AND LEGISLATURE (1944) of the Judicial Council of California; STUDY 011 STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IN NEw JERSEY (1941); and the Omo ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
CoMMissrnN's REPORT TO THE GovERNOR AND GENERAL AssEMBLY 011 THE STATE 011
Omo (1945).
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field, has come from the American Bar Association. In 1937, that
organization's Section on Judicial Administration created a Committee
on Administrative Agencies and Tribunals. In 1939, that committee
set forth a draft of a proposed statute dealing with certain major phases
of state administrative procedure.85 It was this draft act which served
as the origin of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act,86 which
was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in October 1946.87
At least a dozen states now have legislation which deals with all
or some of the subjects covered in the Model Act.88 Some of them,
such as Wisconsin,89 have laws which are patterned more or less closely
upon the Model Act. Others have statutes which are even more comprehensive. Especially noteworthy in this respect is the Administrative Procedure Act of California.90 Under it, there is established a
Division of Administrative Procedure. Such an investigating and reporting unit was, it should be noted, advocated in both the Attorney
General's Committee91 and Benjamin Reports92 and the reports of the
California body, in the words of one observer, "already seem to justify
the experiment."93 In addition, there is maintained in the California
Division a staff of qualified hearing officers sufficient to £11 the needs
of the various state agencies. The California law here is, in effect,
providing for a "pool" of administrative hearing officers to be assigned
from time to time to various agencies.94 This device for securing the
independence of hearing officers appears to be working to the satisfaction of California administrative lawyers. "All in all," concludes a
85 64 A.B.A. Rep. 407 (1939).
86 See HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CoNFERBNCE OF CoMMissIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAws 226 (1943).
87 The act was promulgated as a Model Act rather than a Uniform Act because it was
recognized that the details of administrative procedure must necessarily vary from state to
state.
88 Heady, "State Administrative Procedure Laws: An Appraisal," 12 Ptlll. AD. REv.
10 (1952).
sowis. Stat. (1951) §§227.01 to 227.21.
90 Cal. Govt. Code (Deering, 1951) §§11370 to 11445, 11500 to 11528.
91 A'ITORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT 123.
92BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THB STATE oF NEw YoRK 18
(1942).
93 Nathanson, ''Recent Statutory Developments in State Administrative Law," 33
lowA L. REv. 252 at 290 (1948).
94 It should be noted, however, that, under the California act, agencies need not utilize
this "pool." Any agency requiring full-time hearing officers has authority to appoint its own
officers.
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recent study, "this experiment with a central panel of hearing officers
has been a success and deserves the attention of other states."95
As noted in the most recent edition of the Book of the States published by the Council of State Governments, "In the past two years,
State governments have shown unparalleled interest in re-examining
their administrative agencies and establishments."96 Some three-quarters of the states have set up ''little Hoover commissions" to study the
problem of administrative reorganization. Their activities have greatly
stimulated what has been called a pronounced "movement toward the
enactment of general statutes containing codes of procedure to be followed by regulatory agencies."97 The growth of this movement, which
has certainly been one of the most important developments in our administrative law during the past decade, shows no sign of diminishing.
In 1952, a comprehensive administrative procedure law was adopted
in Michigan, and proposals for similar laws are receiving legislative
consideration in a number of other states.98
Right to be Heard
Rule-making. As a general proposition, the existence of the right
to be heard depends upon the nature of the particular administrative
function at issue. If the administrative proceeding is one involving
rule-making, the courts start with the assumption that there is no right
to notice and hearing in the absence of provision therefor in the relevant enabling act. "[I]n legislation, or rule-making," the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has asserted, "there is no constitutional
right to any hearing whatsoever."99 In the federal field, at any rate,
this principle has been established since Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado.100
In that case, the Court sustained an order of the State Board of Equalization of Colorado increasing the valuation of all taxable property in
the City of Denver forty per cent, as against the claim that it violated
due process because no opportunity was given to the affected taxpayers
to be heard before the order was made. "Where a rule of conduct
95 Heady, "State Administrative Procedure Laws: An Appraisal," 12 Ptm. Ao. REv.
10 at 15 (1952).
oa 1952 ed., p. 147.
97 Heady, "State Administrative Procedure Laws: An. Appraisal," 12 Ptm. Ao. REv.
10 (1952).
98 See 4 Ao. I.Aw BuL. (A.B.A. Ad. Law Section) 131 (1952).
99Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, (9th Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 676 at 694.
100 239 U.S. 441, 36 S.Ct. 141 (1915).
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applies to more than a few people," declared Justice Holmes in an oft-.
quoted passage, "it is impractical that every one should have a direct
voice in its adoption. . . . There must be a limit to individual argument in such matters if government is to go on."101
The decision in the Bi-Metallic case rests upon the fact that the
administrative action there at issue affected a relatively large group.
That Justice Holmes himself recognized this is shown by his distinguishing of Londoner -v. Denver,1° 2 which involved an assessment
by a local board of a tax for the cost of paving a street upon the abutting
land owners. The Court there had stated that "due process of law requires that at some stage of the proceedings before the tax becomes
irrevocably fixed, the taxpayer shall have an opportunity to be
heard."103 But Justice Holmes said in the Bi-Metallic case that this
principle does not apply where a rule which is general in applicability
is at issue. Londoner v. Denver concerned a relatively small number
of persons who were e.xceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds, and it was held that they had a right to a hearing.
But that decision is far from reaching a general determination dealing
only with the principle upon which all the assessments in a county had
been laid.104 In other words, under the Bi-.Metallic case, notice and
hearing need not be given where the rule lays down a principle which
is to be applied generally. The same is not true where the agency
action, though legislative in character, affects the rights and obligations of particular individuals.
That this is the ground upon which the Bi-Metallic case and
Londoner -v. Denver can be distinguished is shown by a decision of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. In that case, the Securities and Exchange Commission had issued a rule which denied exemption under the Public Utility Holding Company Act to a subsidiary
in reorganization whose securities were guaranteed by a registered
holding company. In actual fact, this rule was applicable only to a
particular subsidiary of petitioner holding company. Petitioner had
sought a formal hearing prior to the promulgation of the rule, but such
a hearing had been denied by the SEC. In this, said the court, the
commission was in error. 'We think the order of the Commission
revoking the exemption ... was invalid," reads the opinion, "for lack
of an adequate hearing. . . . It is elementary that the action of an
101 Id. at 445.
102210 U.S. 373, 28 S.Ct. 708 (1908).
103 Id. at 385.
104 239 U.S. 441 at 446.
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administrative tribunal is adjudicatory in character if it is particular
and immediate, rather than, as in the case of legislative or rule-making
action, general and future in effect. . . . Within this definition, the
Commission's order ... is adjudicatory as to Pittsburgh. It is particular, i.e., it applies to the Pittsburgh reorganization alone."105
The court may well have erred in its assumption that the administrative function at issue in this case was judicial in nature, since the
order was particular in its applicability.100 It appears preferable, following the famous test laid down by Justice Holmes in Prentis 11.
Atlantic Coast Line Co.,107 which is adopted in the definition section
of the federal Administrative Procedure Act,1° 8 to say that the SEC
action did not lose its legislative character merely because it applied
to a specific individual or situation. What is important, however, is
the recognition by the federal court that, since the SEC order promulgating the rule was particular jn applicability, it had to be preceded
by a full hearing. It is only where, as in the Bi-Metallic case, the rule
at issue applies generally that notice and hearing are not necessary.
The distinction between rules of general and particular applicability, for the purposes of determining whether notice and hearing
must be given appears, however, at first glance to have been lost sight
of by the Supreme Court in Bowles 11. Willingham. 109 In that case,
the Price Administrator, acting under the authority given him in section 2(b) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, had issued a
declaration designating twenty-eight areas in various parts of the country, including Macon, Georgia, as defense-rental areas. .Several weeks
later, the Administrator issued Maximum Rent Regulation No. 26
establishing the maximum rents for housing in these defense areas.
The maximum rentals fixed for housing accommodations rented on
April 1, 1941 were the rents obtained on that date. As respects housing accommodations rented for the first time since April 1, 1941, it was
provided that the maximum rent should be the first rent charged after
April 1, 1941. But in that case it was provided that the Rent Director
might order a decrease on his own initiative on the ground, among
others, that the rent was higher than that generally prevailing in the
area for comparable housing accommodations on April 1, 1941.
105 Philadelphia Co. v. Securities 8c Exchange Commission, (D. C. Cir. 1948) 175 F.
(2d) 808 at 816.
100 But see DrCKINSON, AnMINISTRATIVl! Jasnc:a AND THB SUPREMACY OF LAw 21
(1927), which uses a similar test.
101211 U.S. 210 at 226, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908).
10s Section 2(c).
100 321 U.S. 503, 64 S.Ct. 641 (1944).
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At this stage, there were no procedural requirements which the
Administrator had to follow other than those specified in the enabling
act. The declaration designating defense-rental areas and the maximum rent regulation were clearly general in applicability within the
principle of the Bi-Metallic case, and hence could be issued without
giving all of those who might be affected an opportunity to be heard.
But the administrative action which followed did apply only to a particular landlord. In June 1943, the Rent Director gave written notice
to Mrs. Willingham that he proposed to decrease the maximum rents
for three apartments owned by her, which were first rented in the
summer of 194 I, on the ground that the first rents for these apartments
received after April I, 1941 were in excess of those generally prevailing in the area for comparable accommodations on that date. Mrs.
Willingham £led objections to that proposed action together with supporting affidavits. The Rent Director thereupon advised her that he
would proceed to issue an order reducing the rents. In the present suit,
it was claimed that the administrative procedure authorized by the act
violated the Fifth Amendment because there was no provision for a
hearing to landlords before the order or regulation fixing rents became
effective.
The Court, through Justice Douglas, had no difficulty in disposing
of Mrs. Willingham's contention on this point. "Obviously, Congress
would have been under no necessity to give notice and provide a hearing before it acted, had it decided to £ix rents on a national basis the
same as it did for the District of Columbia. . . . Congress need not
make that requirement when it delegates the task to an administrative agency."110 Justice Holmes' opinion in the Bi-Metallic case is
cited, and, as has been indicated, it supports the view that the general
regulation fixing maximum rents in defense-rental areas need not be
preceded by notice and opportunity to be heard. But what about the
order of the Rent Director reducing the rents for the apartments owned
by Mrs. Willingham?
The opinion of Justice Douglas is not clear on this point, for he
does not differentiate between Maximum Rent Regulation No. 26, the
general rent-fixing regulation, and the order affecting Mrs. Willingham as an individual landlord. His language on this point is taken
almost verbatim from the opinion of Judge Magruder in Avant v.
Bowles.111 Yet that case did not involve an order affecting a particular
110 Id.
111

at 519.
(Em. Ct. App. 1943) 139 F. (2d) 70~ at 706.
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landlord. It dealt only with the validity of the general Maximum Rent
Regulation No. 26 and, in such a case, there is "no reason why the
due process clause should be read as imposing a requirement that the
administrative agency must give notice and hearing to all the landlords in the defense-rental area before issuing a regulation in pursuance
of its delegated power."112 In Bowles 'tl. Willingham, both Maximum
Rent Regulation No. 26 and the order affecting only the individual
landlord were involved. The answer of Justice Douglas to the due
process question is adequate only insofar as the general regulation is
concerned. It does not explain why Mrs. Willingham did not have a
right to a full hearing before the promulgation of the order affecting
her individually.113
Though Justice Douglas is not as clear on this point as one might
have wished, it would appear that his holding that notice and hearing
are not required as a matter of due process extends as well to the particular order to Mrs. Willingham. Though apparently contrary to the
normal rule applicable to the exercise of legislative functions which
are particular in applicability, this result can be justified by other provisions of the statute and regulations and by the purposes of the act.
In the first place, under the regulations, a landlord in Mrs. Willingham's position was not absolutely denied a hearing. A hearing could
be granted if an application for review or a protest was filed within a
stated period after the issuance of an order of the Rent Director. The
postponement of the hearing until after the taking of administrative
action should not, of itself, invalidate such action, even though a hearing
is required by due process.114 In addition, as Justice Douglas points out,
Congress has provided for judicial review of the Administrator's action.115 In such a case, he implies, those affected are given an adequate
hearing at the judicial level.
It is true that the above by themselves would normally not be
enough to justify the promulgation of a rule particular in applicability
without giving those affected an opportunity to be heard. In the normal case, such opportunity must be given before the rule in question
112 Id. at
113 If the

706.
order to Mrs. Willingham involved merely a mechanical or mathematical
application of the principles laid down in the general rent-fixing regulation, she would have
no right to a hearing. Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 10 S.Ct. 533
(1890). That does not, however, appear to have been the case here.
114 Cf. United States v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 291 U.S. 457, 54 S.Ct. 471 (1934).
115 321 U.S. 503 at 520 (1944).
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becomes operative,116 and here its operation was not suspended pending
consideration of the application for review or protest. And, insofar as
the provisions for judicial review are concerned, review as narrow as
that provided for in the Price Control Act should usually not be enough
to justify the denial of the hearing which would otherwise be required
at the administrative level.
·
But a case involving wartime rent control is not a normal case, and
it is this which justifies some relaxation of procedural requirements.
"Congress was dealing here with the exigencies of wartime conditions
and the insistent demands of inflation control. ... The procedure which
Congress adopted was selected with the view of eliminating the necessity for lengthy and costly trials with concomitant dissipation of the
time and energies of all concerned in litigation rather than in the
common war effort.... To require hearings for thousands of landlords
before any rent control order could be made effective might have defeated the program of price control. Or Congress might well have
thought so. National security might not be able to afford the luxuries
of litigation and the long delays which preliminary hearings traditionally have entailed."117
Bowles v. Willingham thus does not bear directly upon the question
of the requirements of due process in the ordinary case. The validity
of action under the war power must be judged wholly in the context
of war. Administrative action need not be held lawful in time of peace
merely because like action would be justified under the war power. In
time of peace, action such as that taken against Mrs. Willingham,
affecting her as an individual property owner, would have to be preceded by notice and hearing.117 a If the administrative action is particular
in applicability, even though it is classed as legislative in character,
those affected should be given an opportunity to be heard.
Adjudication. If an administrative agency is exercising a function
which is judicial in nature, one starts with the assumption that those
affected must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. "It is
elementary also in our system of law," the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has stated, "that adjudicatory action cannot be
validly taken by any tribunal, whether judicial or administrative, except
upon a hearing wherein .each party shall have opportunity to know of
116 United States v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 291 U.S. 457 at 463, 54 S.Ct. 471 (1934).
111 321 U.S. 503 at 520-521.
117aA recent case so holding, under the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, is United
States v. McCrillis, (1st Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 884.
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the claims of his opponent, to hear the evidence introduced against
him, to cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence in his own behalf, and to make argument. This is a requirement of the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution."118
As a practical matter, the question of procedural due process in
connection with the performance of adjudicatory functions rarely comes
up in the federal field, for statutes delegating judicial power to federal
agencies normally provide expressly for notice and hearing. One of the
few cases where there has been no such statutory requirement, where a
judicial function is concerned, has been that of the deportation of aliens.
The Immigration Act of 1917, the basic enabling law in this field until
the revision of the immigration laws in 1952, provides merely that
"any alien who shall have entered or who shall be found in the United
States in violation of any other law of the United States ... shall, upon
the warrant of the Attorney General, be taken into custody and deported." There is no express requirement for any hearing in the
statute. Yet, ever since the Japanese Immigrant case,119 it has been
recognized that an alien has a right to be heard before a deportation
order is issued against him. "It is not competent for . . . any executive
officer ... arbitrarily to cause an alien, who has entered the country,
and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of
its population, although alleged to be illegally here, to be taken into
custody and deported without giving him all opportunity to be heard
upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in the United
States."120
It thus seems clear that there is a due process requirement of a fair
hearing in deportation cases. As recently stated by Justice Jackson,
"the difficulty with any argument premised on the proposition that the
deportation statute does not require a hearing, is that without such
hearing there would be no constitutional authority for deportation.
The constitutional requirement of due process of law derives from the
same source as Congress' power to legislate and, where applicable,
permeates every valid enactment of that body."121 In other words, "the
Courts have read due process into the act, and due process means a
hearing, and ... therefore hearing is an integral part of the Deportation
llBPhiladelphia Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 175 F.
(2d) 808 at 817.
119 189 U.S. 86, 23 S.Ct. 611 (1903).
120 Id. at IOI.
121 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 at 49, 70 S.Ct. 445 (1950).
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Act; in fact just as much as if the act itself in words stated that a hearing should be held."122
In considering whether hearings must be held in immigration cases
as a matter of due process, one should distinguish between deportation
proceedings and alien exclusion proceedings. In the former, as has been
indicated, due process requires that the alien be accorded an opportunity to be heard. With regard to exclusion proceedings, the answer is
not so clear. United States ex rel. Knauff 11. Shaughnessy1 23 indicates
that there is no due process right to a hearing in exclusion cases. The
question there was whether the United States could exclude without
hearing, solely upon a finding by the Attorney General that her admission would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States, the alien
wife of a World War II veteran. As decided by the Court, the case
presented primarily a question of statutory interpretation-had Congress authorized summary administrative action in a case like this? A
bare majority of the Court held that the relevant statutes allowed action
without a hearing. The dissenting Justices felt that the legislative
language was not strong enough to deprive this alien of the hearing
before a board of special inquiry to which aliens seeking admission are
otherwise entitled by statute.124 But, on the question of the authority
of Congress to authorize exclusion without a hearing, the entire Court
appeared in agreement. This should be compared with Justice Jackson's
remark in the Wong Yang Sung case, referred to above,125 that there
would be no constitutional authority for deportation without hearing.
The Court's treatment of the question at issue in the Knauff case indicates that there would be no such constitutional objection in exclusion
cases.
The basis for distinguishing between the position of an aljen in a deportation and in an exclusion case, insofar as constitutional procedural
requirements are concerned, was pointed out by Justice Murphy in an
important case. "Since an alien obviously brings with him no constitutional rights, Congress may exclude him in the first instance for whatever reason it sees fit.... The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for an
alien seeking admission for the first time to these shores. But once an
alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested
122 Eisler

v. Clark, (D.C. D.C. 1948) 77 F. Supp. 610 at 61 I.

12s 338 U.S. 537, 70 S.Ct. 309 (1950).
124 Id. at
125 Supra

545.
note 121.
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with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our
borders."126
Justice Murphy's distinction can be expressed in language which
is more familiar to the student of administrative law. An alien who
has entered the country can be said to have acquired a "right'' in remaining here, of which he cannot be deprived without a hearing. The alien
requesting entry, on the other hand, is seeking a "privilege," which can
be granted on any terms which the legislature wishes. "At the outset,"
stated Justice Minton in the Knauff case, "we wish to point out that
an alien who seeks admission to this country may not do so under any
claim of right. Admission of aliens to the United States is a privilege
granted by the sovereign United States Government. Such privilege is
granted to an alien only upon such terms as the United States shall
prescribe. It must be exercised in accordance with the procedure which
the United States provides."127
Although, as we have seen, one starts with the proposition that
administrative exercises of judicial functions must be preceded by notice
and hearing as a matter of due process, the courts have held that this is
true only in cases involving personal or property "rights." If the case is
characterized by the courts as one involving only a "privilege," there is
no requirement that those affected be heard, unless the enabling act
expressly imposes such requirement. Most of the decisions applying
the privilege-property right distinction have been rendered in occupational license cases arising in the states. Our discussion of the alien
exclusion and deportation case indicates, however, that the distinction
is utilized as the basis of decision in the federal field as well.
The use of the distinction between so-called property rights and
privileges as the basis for determining whether notice and hearing are
required in state occupational license cases has been much criticized.
"It is the belief of the editor," reads a comment in a widely used casebook, "that the privilege-property concept and its various modifications
is of no utility in the field of license revocation, and that any licensee
prior to the withdrawal of the authority conferred upon him by his
permit should have an opportunity to show cause why his license
should not be revoked."128 Nor is the concept of greater usefulness in
the federal £.eld. Insofar as procedural due process is concerned, is
126 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135
l27 338 U.S. 537 at 542. That entry

J., dissenting, id.

at 161, 65 S.Ct. 1443 (1945).
is a privilege was conceded as well by Frankfurter,

at 549.

128 GBI.LBoRN, ADMINISTRATIVE

LAw, 2d ed., 278 (1947).
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there, for example, adequate reason for differentiating the position of
an alien seeking entry from that of one being deported simply because
admission to the United States is termed a privilege instead of a property right? Insofar as its effect upon the individual affected is concerned, a case like the Knauff case should indicate sufficiently that,
regardless of the tag used, an exclusion proceeding is of the very essence
of what the procedural safeguards of notice and hearing are designed
for. And the same is true of other cases involving the grant of so-called
privileges or benefits by the federal government. The fact that the
Congress can deny such privileges altogether should not mean that they
can be denied to particular individuals by an administrative agency
without notice and hearing. "A procedure which is unfair for inflicting
a penalty is not rendered fair by using it for withdrawing a benefit. If
the government ... choses to provide benefits, even outright gifts, the
method of determining the individual recipients must still be fair." 129
Loyalty cases. The privilege-property right distinction has been
used by our courts to enable them to deal with the procedural problems
that have been presented to them under the various ''loyalty" programs
that have been instituted in this country. In two cases decided by the
Supreme Court in 1951, there was involved the question of the right
to be heard prior to administrative action taken under the Employees
Loyalty Program of the federal government. The way in which the
Court dealt with the problem in those cases has, however, done little,
if anything, to clarify the applicable legal principles. In one of them,
the Court decided without rendering any opinion, affirming, by an
equally divided vote, the decision of a divided court of appeals. In the
other, there was a separate opinion by each of the five Justices who
concurred in the decision.
In Bailey 11. Richardson,1 30 plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment
and an order directing her reinstatement in government employment.
Plaintiff had been discharged after she had been found by the Loyalty
Review Board to be "disloyal to the Government of the United States."
Among other things the complaint alleged that plaintiff had not been
afforded before the Board a hearing such as due process required in a
case of this type.131 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
129 Davis,

''The Requirement of Opportunity to be Heard in the Administrative Proc-

ess," 51 YALB L.J. 1093 at 1123 (1942).
341 U.S. 918, 71 S.Ct. 669 (1951).
Since the government moved to dismiss, all of the allegations in the complaint must
be taken as admitted for the purposes of the decision.
130

131
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in a two-to-one decision, upheld the administrative procedure which
had been followed. 132 The Supreme Court affirmed, four-to-four,133
without any opinion. The opinion of the court of appeals thus remains
the opinion in the case and because of the significance of the problem
involved it is important to go into its basis.
According to Judge Prettyman, who delivered the opinion of the
court of appeals, the due process clause does not restrict the President's discretion or the prescriptive power of Congress in respect to
executive personnel. The reason he reaches this conclusion can be
gathered from the following passage in his opinion:
"In the absence of statute or ancient custom to the contrary,
executive offices are held at the will of the appointing authority, not
for life or for fixed terms. If removal be at will, of what purpose would
process be? To hold office at the will of a superior and to be removable
therefrom only by constitutional due process of law are opposite and
inherently conllicting ideas. Due process of law is not applicable unless
one is being deprived of something to which he has a right."134
The opinion of the federal court thus turns upon the fact that the
government employee does not have any "right'' to his employment
which the courts will protect. As it was recently expressed by the
New York Court of Appeals, in an opinion dealing with basically the
same problem presented in the Bailey case,"... a public employee has
no vested, proprietary right to his position ... public employment as a
teacher is not an uninhibited privilege."135
One wonders whether the use of the distinction between so-called
property rights and privileges as the basis for determining whether
notice and hearing are required in cases involving government employees is any more justified than it is in other administrative law cases.
The fact that the legislature can deny a privilege such as government
employment altogether should not mean that it can be denied by the
administration in individual instances without notice and hearing. It
should, however, be recognized that the courts have tended to follow
the "right-privilege" distinction in determining whether notice and
hearing need be accorded. Bailey 11. Richardson is but the most recent
example of this tendency, though it is greatly to be regretted that the
equal division in the Supreme Court in that case has prevented that
tribunal from articulating its views upon the subject.
132 (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46.
138 Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
134 182 F. (2d) 46 at 58.
185Thompson v. Wallin, 301 N.Y. 476 at 489, 95 N.E. (2d) 806 (1950).
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In Bailey v. Richardson we are unfortunate in not having any opinion by the Supreme Court to aid us in dealing with the problem of
whether notice and hearing are required in cases involving government
employees. In Joint_ Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,1 36
which dealt with a related aspect of the problem, we are equally unfortunate, but for the opposite reason. Here, we have not a paucity, but
an overabundance of opinions.137 And it is in some ways even more
difficult to determine exactly what the Court's views are in the AntiFascist Committee case than in Bailey v. Richardson.
Plaintiff in the Anti-Fascist Committee case sought an injunction
to restrain the Attorney General and the Chairman and members of the
Loyalty Review Board from designating it as a subversive organization.
Under Executive Order 9835, promulgated by the President on March
21, 1947, the Attorney General is to furnish the Loyalty Review Board
with the name of each organization which he, "after appropriate investigation and determination," designates as subversive. The Board
is directed to disseminate such information to all departments and
agencies to guide them in employing and discharging employees. In
the instant case, the complaint was based upon the action of the Attorney General, without notice or hearing, in designating plaintiff as
a subversive organization and listing its name as such in a letter to the
Loyalty Review Board, and the action of the Board in distributing the
letter to departments and agencies in the executive branch of the government and releasing the same to the press.138
The question of whether the Attorney General could act without
notice and hearing in a case of this type is dealt with most adequately
in the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter 39 and the dissenting
opinion of Justice Reed.140 Justice Reed's approach is much like that
which has already been discussed. Notice and hearing are required
before valid administrative action can be taken, he says, only "where
complainant will lose some property or enforceable civil or statutory
rights by the action taken or proposed."141 There is no deprivation of
any property or liberty of any listed organization by the Attorney General's designation. A "mere abstract declaration" by an administrator
136 341 U.S. 123,
137 There was an

71 S.Ct. 624 (1951).
opinion by Burton, J., joined by Douglas, J., and separate opinions
by Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Jackson, J.J. In addition, there was a dissenting opinion by Reed, J., joined by Vinson, C.J., and Minton, J.
138 What was said above in note 131 with regard to the Bailey case applies with equal
force here.
139 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 at 149 (1951).
140 Id. at 187.
141 Id. at 202.
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regarding the character of an organization, without the effect of forbidding or compelling conduct on the part of plaintiff, does not require notice and hearing.
To Justice Frankfurter a different approach is the desirable one.
In the first place, he says, it is unreal to assert that because the Attorney General's designation imposes no legal sanction upon listed organizations this is a mere abstract declaration which does not directly affect
plaintiff. "It would be blindness . . . not to recognize that in the
conditions of our time such designation drastically restricts the organizations, if it does not proscribe them."142 The learned Justice then
proceeds to discuss the due process aspect of administrative law.
The requirement of due process, he asserts, "is not a fair-weather
or timid assurance."143 It must be respected at all times. Nor is it
a technical conception with a fixed content, which can be "imprisoned
within the treacherous limits of any formula"144-which would imply
the rejection of any mechanical test, such as the "right-privilege" distinction discussed above. The cases in which it has been held that
due process requires a full hearing prior to administrative action are
then summarized, and one feels that Justice Frankfurter is on the verge
of asserting that due process demands notice and hearing before the
Attorney General can act in this case.
But the assertion is never made. The opinion goes on to state that
Executive Order 9835 itself must be interpreted so as to require a
hearing. Statutes and regulations, says Justice Frankfurter, should be
construed so as not to be inconsistent with the demands of fair procedure. There is a burden upon the Attorney General of showing
weighty reason for the departure from a rule so deeply imbedded in
history and in the demands of justice. The Executive Order states only
that the Attorney General should act "after appropriate investigation
and determination." This does not preclude a full hearing and the
order should be construed so as to require it.
What then is the exact status of the procedural aspect of the federal government's loyalty program? It is important to bear in mind
that, in neither Bailey 11. Richardson nor the Anti-Fascist Committee
case, has the Supreme Court held that the procedure prescribed by
Executive Order 9835 violates the demands of due process.145 Under
142 Id. at 161.
14a Id. at 162.
144Ibid.
145 See McCarran,

(1951).

''The Supreme Court and the Loyalty Program," 37 A.B.A.J. 434
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the Bailey case, indeed, it is clear that a government employee may be
discharged for disloyalty without a full hearing. In the Anti-Fascist
Committee case, there are, it is true, indications that due process demands a hearing before an organization can be listed as subversive by
the Attorney General. It is not, however, dear why the organization
has a "right" which is protected by due process in these cases, while
the government employee, who may lose his job because of his membership in an organization upon the Attorney General's list, has only an
unprotected "privilege." The answer of some of the Justices to this
would undoubtedly be that the organization is defamed by an unjust
listing, and it is its right not to be defamed that is adversely affected by
the administrative action.146 This may be true, but it is difficult to see
why it does not apply as well to the government employee. Is not Mrs.
Bailey stigmatized at least as much as the Anti-Fascist Committee when
she is discharged because she is found to be "disloyal to the Government of the United States?"146 a

Right to oral hearing. In the celebrated case of Local Government
Board -v. Arlidge,1 41 the House of Lords emphatically denied that those
affected by administrative action had a right to be heard orally before
the agency concerned. "Can it be said," asked Lord Parmoor, "that in
a case in which the statute gives the right to a public local inquiry, and
in which the statutory rules of procedure do not provide for oral testimony before the Local Government Board, the mere refusal to hear
such oral testimony amounts to a denial of the principles of substantial
justice?"148 In this country, on the other hand, in those cases where
notice and hearing must be held in connection with the exercise of a
particular administrative function, it has been assumed that the private
party has the right to be heard orally. "In our jurisprudence," asserted
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1949, "an opportunity to present contentions orally, with whatever advantages that
method of presentation has, is one of the rudiments of the fair play
required when property is being taken or destroyed."149
146 The opinion of Burton, J., refers to the "right of a bona fide charitable organization
to carry on its work, free from defamatory statements.•••" 341 U.S. at 141.
146a The Court of Appeals for Second Circuit has answered this question in the negative. Angilly v. United States, (2d Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 642.
141 [1915) A.C. 120.
148 Id. at 145.
1 40 Standard Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, (D.C. Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 18
at 21.
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Some of the language in the opinion of the Supreme Court in
Federal Communications Commission 11. WJR150 may appear at first
glance to cast doubt upon the statement that the right to be heard
orally is an essential element in a case where notice and hearing are
demanded by due process. In that case, the Federal Communications
Commission had granted an application for a permit to construct a
radio broadcasting station on the frequency which previously had been
used exclusively by WJR. WJR then filed a petition for reconsideration on the ground that the new station would cause objectionable
interference with its broadcast signal. This petition was denied in a
written opinion rendered without prior oral argument. WJR then
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which
held that the Fifth Amendment assured to WJR the right of oral argument before the Commission.151
The court of appeals was reversed by a unanimous Supreme Court,
which took special issue with the assertion of the lower court that an
opportunity for oral argument was an inherent element of procedural
due process in all judicial or quasi-judicial determinations of questions
of law outside of such questions as may arise upon interlocutory matters. "[T]he broad generalization made by the Court of Appeals," said
Justice Rutledge, "is not the law. Rather it is in conflict with this
Court's rulings, in effect, that the right of oral argument as a matter
of procedural due process varies from case to case in accordance with
differing circumstances. . . ."152
It is a mistake to assume, as the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia has done,1 53 that the WJR opinion goes so far as to imply
that the right to be heard orally need not be afforded in all cases where
the administrative function is such that due process requires notice and
hearing in connection with its exercise. This is true despite Justice
Rutledge's broad statement that "the Constitution does not require oral
argument in all cases where . . . even substantial ones [questions of
law] are raised."154 As he himself pointed out in a later portion of his
opinion, such generalizations are fraught with danger. "This is not a
337 U.S. 265, 69 S.Ct. 1097 (1949).
(D.C. Cir. 1948) 174 F. (2d) 226.
1r;2 337 U.S. 265 at 276.
1 53 American Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, (D.C. Cir.
1949) 179 F. (2d) 437. That this assumption is not confined to observers in this country
is shown by Gopalan v. State of Madras, 13 Indian Sup. Ct. J. 174 at 194 (1950).
154 337 U.S. 265 at 276.
150
151
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matter ... for broadside generalization and indiscriminate application.
It is rather one for case-to-case determination, through which alone
account may be taken of differences in the particular interests affected,
circumstances involved, and procedures prescribed by Congress for dealing with them."1515
The result in the WJR case can be explained on the basis of the
particular facts involved. WJR was not entitled to be heard orally
because, under the facts of the case, it was not entitled to be heard at
all as a matter of right. In Federal Communications Commission 11.
National Broadcasting Co.156-better known as the KOA case-the
Court had held that, under the Communications Act, a licensee who
claimed that the grant of an application for a license on the same frequency would cause objectionable interference with its own broadcast
signal was entitled to be heard in opposition to the application. In the
WJR case, the possibility of objectionable interference was not conceded. "Contrary to the situation here, in the KOA case the Commission's proposed grant of a new license . . . concededly created interference against which the existing rules of the Commission protected
the prior license of KOA."157 In the WJR case, as is shown by the
decision of the court of appeals upon remand, WJR's petition "did not
allege that, under the permissive provisions of the Regulations, it had
applied for or been granted . . . protection beyond the normal contour area as prescribed by the Standards. It did not assert in its petition any threatened impingement upon that area. It is our view,
therefore, that upon the allegations of its petition appellant showed no
right to intervene in or be made a party to the Coastal Plains proceeding. . . ."158 Since WJR did not even have the right to be made a
party, it seems clear that it could be denied oral argument.
The WJR case is thus far from holding that, where due process
demands notice and hearing, the private party need not be heard orally.
If the right to notice and hearing in the cases we have been discussing
is to be a substantial right, it must mean that· the party affected can
present his evidence and arguments at an oral hearing. Indeed, as we
have seen, under the Wong Yang Sung159 case, where due process requires a hearing in connection with the exercise of a particular function by a federal administrative agency, the hearing afforded must be
155 Id. at 277.
156 319 U.S. 239,

63 S.Ct. 1035 (1943).
1r;1337 U.S. 265 at 280.
lliSWJR v. Federal Communications Commission, (D.C. Cir. 1949) 178 F. (2d) 720
at 721.
159 339 U.S. 33, 70 S.Ct. 445 (1950).
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conducted in accordance with the formal adjudicatory requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act.
Conduct of Hearing
Evidence. It is today almost hornbook law that the common-law
rules of evidence are not, as such, binding upon administrative agencies, in the absence of statutory provisions that they are to control.
"Administrative agencies like the Federal Trade Commission," stated
Justice Black in 1948, ''have never been restricted by the rigid rules of
evidence.... [R]ules which bar certain types of evidence in criminal or
quasi-criminal cases are not controlling in proceedings like this, where
the effect of the Commission's order is not to punish or to fasten liability on respondents for past conduct but to ban specific practices for
the future in accordance with the general mandate of Congress."160
An interesting opinion by Judge Wyzanski indicates that the trend
toward the relaxation of the evidentiary rules in administrative proceedings may lead to a similar relaxation in analogous judicial proceedings.
The case referred to involved a civil antitrust action by the United
States. Defendants had objected to the introduction of certain documents as hearsay. Judge Wyzanski held, however, that, in such a case,
the trial judge was not required to exclude every type of hearsay evidence. Such a view, said he, was needed to achieve consistency in
the application of the antitrust laws by the federal courts and by the
Federal Trade Commission and was essential if the job of finding the
facts in civil antitrust proceedings was not hereafter to be vested exclusively in administrative agencies. "The original demand for administrative adjudication," asserts the opinion, "was traceable, in part at
least, to the unwillingness of courts to admit evidence which they
allowed administrative agencies to receive and act upon. And that
demand would be reinforced if the courts were to continue to say that
in social 2.Ild economic controversies where the remedy is not imprisonment, or fine, or damages but an order prescribing future conduct, a
court sitting without a jury cannot receive hearsay evidence even
though without statutory authority an administrative agency could do
so. To preserve their own jurisdiction the courts must in this type of
controversy relax the rigidity of the hearsay rule."161
100 Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 at 705, 68 S.Ct.
793 (1948). It should be noted, however, that, under the Taft-Hartley Act, National
Labor Relations Board proceedings must now "so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United States."
1a1 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1950) 89 F. Supp.
349 at 356.
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The question of the admissibility of evidence does not today present
any real problems, in the light of the tendency in this country to free
the administration from the exclusionary rules of evidence. The difficult question which still remains is that of the extent to which legally
incompetent evidence can be relied upon to support a finding. Under
the so-called "legal residuum" rule, which was first articulated in 1916
by the New York Court of Appeals,1 62 though an administrative agency
may admit incompetent evidence, its decision cannot rest solely upon
such evidence. That rule has been strongly criticized by Wigmore,
among others, who felt that it still virtually requires the agency to test
its proceedings by the jury-trial rules and "thus holds out the temptation to practitioners to employ the whole arsenal of technical weapons,
and secure a record full of 'errors.' "163 With all respect, it is difficult
to see the justice of this criticism. Under the ''legal residuum" rule,
the administration is expressly freed from the common-law rules of
evidence. Since any evidence at all may be admitted, practitioners
know that a "record full of errors" cannot be secured no matter how
freely they may employ their "arsenal of technical weapons." All that
is required is that the administrative findings themselves be supported
to some extent by competent evidence. If the legal rules of evidence
have any relation to the search for truth, then the "legal residuum"
rule is a sound one.
It has often been asserted that the federal courts refuse to follow
the "legal residuum" rule. And this is true despite the famous statement of Chief Justice Hughes in the Consolidated Edison case: "Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence."164 As it has often been expressed, the federal courts will look
only to the quantity, not to the quality, of the evidence supporting a
finding. If the supporting evidence is substantial, the finding will be
upheld even though the evidence may be incompetent. A question
which has not yet been determined, however, is that of the effect of
section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act upon the federal
practice. According to Professor Davis, "Congress in the APA clearly
avoided the requirement of competent evidence to support a 6.nding."165 One wonders whether that is, indeed, the meaning of the
Administrative Procedure Act provision that orders and rules must be
162 Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916).
163 1 WIGMORll, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., 40 (1940), quoted in DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
I.Aw 458 (1951).
164 Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197 at 230,
59 S.Ct. 206 (1938).
165 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE I.Aw 459 (1951).
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"supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence."166 Under this, the reviewing court would appear to
be required to cqnsider the quality as well as the quantity of the evidence. It is difficult to see how supporting evidence can be "probative"
if it is wholly incompetent evidence. As stated by the Senate Judiciary
Committee, under section 7(c), "the standards and principles of probity
and reliability of evidence must be the same as those prevailing in courts
of law and equity in nonadministrative cases."167
A famous case which takes this view, though it was decided before
the Administrative Procedure Act, is Bridges v. Wixon. 168 In that case,
the Supreme Court invalidated a deportation order which rested upon
hearsay. It is true, said Justice Douglas, who delivered the opinion for
the majority of the Court, that the courts have been liberal in relaxing
the ordinary rules of evidence in administrative hearings. But this was
not an ordinary administrative proceeding. "Here the liberty of an individual is at stake. . . . That deportation is a penalty-at times a most
serious one-cannot be doubted. Meticulous care must be exercised lest
the procedure by which he is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential standards of fairness." 169
The Court's decision in the Bridges case has been strongly criticized.170 If the Court meant to imply that the same rules of evidence
apply in a deportation case as in a criminal case,1 71 such censure
appears to be justified. It is not, however, necessary to interpret the
Court's opinion as going that far. Strictly speaking, all Justice Douglas
did was to hold that a deportation order based on hearsay could not
stand. Though such an order may not be invalidated merely because
incompetent evidence was admitted, he declared, "the case is different
166 Section 7(c) (Emphasis added).
167 ADMINISTRATIVE PnoCEDUBE Ac:r:

LI!crsLATIVE HrsTORY 208 (1946). This view
is borne out of In re KNAUFF, Pnm & FrsCHBR, 1 Ad. Law (2d) 639, a 1951 decision of
the Board of Immigration Appeals, approved by the Attorney General, and the most recent
phase of a now-celebrated alien exclusion proceeding. In that case, the Board, in effect,
based its decision upon the "legal residuum" rule, saying that while hearsay evidence is
clearly admissible in an administrative proceeding, if it is uncorroborated, an order may
not be based upon it. "Hearsay is still hearsay whether it is introduced into a court or
before an administrative agency. The line of cases which permits the admission of hearsay
evidence and the relaxation in administrative hearings of traditional rules of evidence has
been widely misinterpreted by administrative boards and commissions. It does not give
them carte blanche to consider that everything and anything is of the highest probative
value." Id. at 642.
168 326 U.S. 135, 65 S.Ct. 1443 (1945).
150 Id. at 154.
110 See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 464-466 (1951).
171 As id. at 464 contends.
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where evidence was improperly received and where but for that evidence it is wholly speculative whether the requisite finding would
have been made."172 In effect, this is a pre-Administrative Procedure
Act use of the "legal residuum" rule in the deportation field. In the
light of what has been said above with regard to that rule, one can
sympathize with the judicial desire to apply it in a proceeding which
has such consequences for the individual concerned, which may, as
Justice Brandeis once pointed out, result "in loss of both property and
life; or of all that makes life worth living."173

Bias. In Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute,1 14 it
was claimed that an FTC cease-and-desist order was invalid because of
the alleged bias of the Commission. The case involved a proceeding
against the cement industry having to do with the legality of the multiple basing point system of pricing used in that industry. The charge
of bias in the FTC was based upon copies of the Commission's reports
made to Congress and the President. "These reports, as well as testimony given by members of the Commission before congressional
committees, make it clear that long before the filing of this complaint
the members of the Commission at that time, or at least some of them,
we:i:e of the opinion that the operation of the multiple basing point
system as they had studied it was the equivalent of a price fixing restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act."175
But, said the Court, the fact that ·the Commission had entertained
such views as the result of its prior ex parte investigations did not
necessarily mean that the minds of its members were irrevocably'
closed on the subject. Here, the respondents were legally authorized
participants in the hearings, and were free to rebut by evidence and
arguments the conclusions which the Commission had previously
reached. If opinions of the Commission expressed in congressionally
required reports would bar its members from acting in unfair trade
proceedings, "experience acquired from their work as commissioners
would be a handicap instead of an advantage."176
Reliance was also placed, to some extent, upon the so-called doctrine
of necessity. The Court asserted that had the entire membership of the
Commission disqualified in these proceedings, this complaint could not
have been acted upon by the FTC or by any other government agency.
112 326 U.S. 135 at 156.
11s Ng Fung Ho v. White,
174 333 U.S. 683, 68 S.Ct.
1111 Id. at 700.
116 Id. at 702.

259 U.S. 276 at 284, 42 S.Ct. 492 (1922).
793 (1948).
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The result would be that the Commission, by making studies and
filing reports in obedience to congressional command, would completely immunize "the practices investigated, even though they are
'unfair,' from any cease and desist order by the Commission or any
other governmental agency."177
The Court's decision in the Cement Institute case should be compared with its similar disposition of an allegation of bias on the part
of an NLRB trial examiner. In National Labor Relations Board 11.
Donnelly Garment Co.,1 78 proceedings before the NLRB had resulted
in a cease and desist order against the employer. Review of this order
came before the court of appeals, which found that the employer had
been denied a fair hearing in not being allowed to present certain
testimony, and remanded the case to the Board.179 The NLRB then
set the case for a second hearing before the original examiner, whom
the employer insisted was biased because of his prior findings against
it. The Board denied a motion for a new examiner. The court of
appeals held that the denial was improper, pointing out the unfairness
of trying issues of fact to those who may have prejudged them.180
The Supreme Court, through Justice Frankfurter, reversed, asserting
that the rule applied below was far stricter than the principles governing disqualification in judicial proceedings. 'We find no warrant for
imposing upon administrative agencies a stiffer rule, whereby examiners would be disentitled to sit because they ruled strongly against
a party in the first hearing."181
The problem involved in the Cement Institute and Donnelly
cases is essentially that of a claimed prejudgment of the issues by
an administrative trier of fact. Such prejudgment is normally not
enough to disqualify a judge in a court of law.182 One may, it is true,
disagree with the basis of the judicial rule on the ground that one
who has already come to a decision with regard to a particular issue
cannot dispose of that issue with that "cold neutrality of an impartial
judge" of which Burke speaks. But if, as is clearly the case, it is uniformly held that mere prejudgment does not disqualify in judicial
177 Id. at 701. For state cases applying the doctrine of necessity, see Caminetti v.
Pacific Mt. Life Ins. Co., 22 Cal. (2d) 344, 139 P. (2d) 908 (1943); Rinaldi v. Mongiello,
4 N.J. Super. 7, 66 A. (2d) 182 (1949); Emerson v. Hughes, (Vt. 1952) 90 A. (2d) 910.
118 330 U.S. 219, 67 S.Ct. 756 (1947).
179 Donnelly Garment Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (8th Cir. 1941) 123
F. (2d) 215.
180 Donnelly Garment Co. v. NLRB, (8th Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 854 at 870.
181 330 U.S. 219 at 236-237.
182 See Schwartz, "Disqualification for Bias in the Federal District Courts," 11 U:mv.
PnT. L. REv. 415 at 419 (1950).
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proceedings, there is, in Justice Frankfurter's phrase, no warrant for
imposing a stricter standard upon the administrative judge.
A more difficult problem arises out of claims of bias as evidenced
by the partiality with which the administrative hearing has been conducted. The basic principle in such cases is that stated by Circuit
Judge Hutcheson in 1943. "A fair trial," said he, ''by an unbiased
and non-partisan trier of the facts is of the essence of the adjudicatory
process as well when the judging is done in an administrative proceeding by an administrative functionary as when it is done in a court by
a judge."183 To prove undue predilection on the part of the officer
who presides at the hearing is, however, quite another thing, as shown
by the paucity of cases in which such claims of prejudice have been
upheld.184 The burden upon those who seek to prove such claims is
well shown by a recent Supreme Court decision. In National Labor
Relations Board v. Pittsburgh S.S. Company,1 85 the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit had refused enforcement of a Board order because of the bias of the trial examiner. According to that court, whenever there was a conflict of evidence, the witnesses for the company
were held to be untrustworthy and those for the union reliable, and
this, said the court, indicated bias on the examiner's part. The Supreme
Court rejected the lower court's conclusion that an objective finder of
fact could not resolve all factual conflicts arising in a legal proceeding
in favor of one litigant. "Total rejection of an opposed view," asserted
Justice Rutledge, "cannot of itself impugn the integrity or competence
of a trier of fact."186
Under the holding of this case, it would appear to be most difficult, if not impossible, to prove bias on the part of an administrative
hearing officer. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the
quoted portion of the opinion was not necessary for the decision, since
the Court expressly stated that <Jcareful scrutiny of th~ record belies
the view that the trial examiner did in fact believe all union testimony
or that he even believed the union version of every disputed factual
issue."187
183 National

Labor Relations Board v. Phelps, (5th Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 562 at

563.
184 Ibid. Cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Ray Smith Co., (5th Cir. 1951) 193
F. (2d) 142.
185 337 U.S. 656, 69 S.Ct. 1283 (1949), reversing (6th Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 126.
186 337 U.S. 656 at 659.
181 Id. at 660.
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Concentration of functions. A problem with which students of
American administrative law have been much concerned has been
that of the merger of the powers of prosecutor and judge in administrative agencies. Concern with this problem, as a New Jersey judge
has pointed out, "springs from the fear that the agency official adjudicating upon private rights cannot wholly free himself from the influences toward partiality inherent in his identification with the investigative and prosecuting aspects of the case; in other words, that the
atmosphere in which he must make his judgments is not conducive to
the critical detachment toward the case expected of the judge. In
a sense the combination of functions violates the ancient tenet of
Anglo-American justice that 'No man shall be a judge in his own
cause.' "188
However much one may echo the uneasiness felt by some courts
at the concentration of functions, it seems clear that it cannot be
attacked on constitutional grounds. In the words of the Minnesota
court, unless there is legislative provision for a divorce between the
complainant and the judge in administrative proceedings, the courts
"must recognize and accept though reluctantly" the validity of the
combination.189 If it is felt that the concentration of functions is
unsatisfactory, it is for the legislature, not the courts, to make provision for separation. Where concentration is encompassed within the
legislative enactment, a federal judge has declared, it "is not repugnant
to constitutional concepts, and the remedy for the evil, if it be called
evil, does not therefore lie in the courts."190
Both the majority and minority of the Attorney General's Committee felt that the "commingling of functions of investigation or
advocacy with the function of deciding are thus plainly undesirable."191
But they differed in the recommendations which they made to deal
with the problem. The minority endorsed the proposal which had
been made by an earlier study1 92 for a complete separation of functions,
with the division of agencies exercising prosecuting and deciding
functions into two independent agencies.193 The majority disagreed
188 In

re Larsen, (N.J. 1952) 86 A. (2d) 430 at 435.
v. Board of Education, 213 Minn. 550 at 566, 7 N.W. (2d) 544 (1942).
190Levers v. Berkshire, (10th Cir. 1947) 159 F. (2d) 689 at 693.
191 R:sPoRT 011 THE ATTORNEY GmraRAL's CoMMITI'l!l! ON ADMINisTRATIVB PnocmDURB 56 (1941).
192 R:sPORT 011 THE PRI!smENr's CoMMI'ITEB ON ADMINisTRATIVB MANAGBMBNT
41-42 (1937).
193 R:sPORT 01' THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CoMMl'l.TBB 206-209.
189 State
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and asserted that the disadvantages of complete separation more than
counterbalanced the advantages claimed. The majority recommended
instead a purely internal separation of functions, which would isolate
those in the various agencies who were engaged in the task of
adjudicating.194
The viewpoint of the minority of the Attorney General's Committee has been followed in one important field of federal administrative activity, that of the regulation of labor. relations. Under the
Wagner Act of 1935, the National Labor Relations Board was a
unified organization, with the Board members at the head and the
General Counsel, as well as other operating officials, completely subject to them. Under the Act of 1935, the NLRB was both prosecutor
and judge in unfair labor practice cases and frequent complaints were
heard against the concentration of functions in it. To meet this problem in the case of the Board, section 3(d) of the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947 was adopted. It provides, in effect, for the
complete separation of the functions of prosecuting and adjudicating
within the NLRB. It does this by setting up the independent Office
of General Counsel in whom alone is vested the responsibility of
investigating and prosecuting unfair labor practice cases. The Board's
function today is solely that of deciding cases brought before it by the
General Counsel. Under these provisions, the NLRB has become
essentially a specialized court in the field of labor relations, divorced
of all non-judicial duties, much as is the Tax Court in the internal
revenue field.195
It should be emphasized, however, that the NLRB type of complete
separation still remains the rare exception in our administrative law.
The federal Administrative Procedure Act follows the approach of
the majority of the Attorney General's Committee in its attempt to deal
with the problem. Under section 5(c), the hearing officer is insulated
from unauthorized contacts with one of the parties. Similarly, attempts
by agency counsel or employees to influence decisions in which they
are interested are precluded. The views of officials who investigated and
prosecuted the case (or a factually related case) can now be presented
194 Id. at
1 95 For a

57-60.
presentation of the views for and against the separation under the TaftHartley Act, see 2 An. LAw BUL. (A.B.A. Ad. Law Section) 67-68 (1950). A presidential plan to terminate the separation in the NLRB, promulgated under the Reorganization
Act of 1949, was rejected by the Senate on May 11, 1950. See Kaukauna v. Dept. of
Taxation, 250 Wis. 196, 26 N.W. (2d) 637 (1947), discussing the complete separation
of functions under a state statute.
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to the hearing examiner and to the agency heads only in the public
proceedings.196
According to Justice Jackson, the fundamental purpose of the
Administrative Procedure Act was "to curtail and change the practice
of embodying in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and
judge."197 And there is little doubt that internal separation such as is
provided for in the Administrative Procedure Act is of value as far as
it goes. Yet it deals "vith the problem only at the level of initial or recommended decision. Section S(c) expressly states that it is not "applicable in any manner to the agency or any member or members of the
body comprising the agency." The question raised by the minority of
the Attorney General's Committee, "can there be a practical separation
of prosecuting and deciding functions where both are subject to one
ultimate authority?"198 is left unanswered. True, some effort is made
to minimize this situation by the provisions for examiner independence
of the agency. But ultimate decision still rests with the agency, which
also exercises supervision over investigation and prosecution.
Process of Decision
Official notice. One of the significant administrative law developments during the past decade has been the growing judicial acceptance
of the doctrine of official notice. Though the assertion is still frequently
made that "Administrative tribunals exercising quasi judicial powers
which are required to make a determination after a hearing cannot act
on their own information,"199 the courts are tending more and more to
permit administrators to rely upon matters which are known to them as
experts even though they have not been formally introduced in evidence.
An illustrative Supreme Court decision is Market Street R. Co. v. Railroad Commission,2° 0 where it was contended that the agency's :findings
could be based solely on expert testimony, subject to cross-examination,
explanation, and rebuttal, and not on its own expert knowledge. This
contention was rejected by the Court. According to Justice Jackson,
the testimony of experts could not bind the Commission, which would
196 See AnoBNEY GmraRAL's MANUAL

ON THB AnMINISTRATIV.B

PnoCBDtlllE Ac:r

50, 54, 56 (1947).
197Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 at 41 (1950).
198 REPORT 011 THB AnoBNEY GENBRAL's CoMM11.TEB 208.
199 La Prade v. Dept. of Water and Power, 27 Cal. (2d) 47 at 51, 162 P. (2d) 13

(1945).
200

324 U.S. 548, 65 S.Ct. 770 (1945).
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itself have to determine what weight, if any, should be given to their
reasoning and conclusions. 'We cannot say," concludes the opinion
on this point, "that it is a denial of due process for a commission so
experienced as the record shows this Commission to have been with the
affairs of this particular appellant to draw inferences as to the probable
effect on traffic of a given rate decrease on such a record as we have
here." 201
Valuable though the doctrine of "official notice" may be in enabling
administrative agencies to make use of their expertise, it should, as far
as possible, be limited to matters noticed in the record. Otherwise, there
is the danger of a decision based upon facts not made available to the
parties. This is, indeed, implicit in the decision of the Court in the
Market Street case. "The basis for a judgment is here in the record....
This is not a case," Justice Jackson took special care to emphasize,
"where the data basic to a judgment have been withheld from the
record."202 Looked at in this way, the "official notice" doctrine is, more
or less, a device for expediting administrative procedure. Under it, an
agency can rely upon materials familiar to it in its expert capacity without the need formally to introduce them in evidence. But this does not
mean that the private party need not be apprised of these matters if they
form the basis of the agency's decision. The doctrine of "official notice"
must thus be subject to the safeguard that the parties be informed of
materials so noticed and be given an opportunity to explain or rebut
them. "The parties . . . are entitled to be apprised of the data upon
which the agency is acting. They are entitled not only to refute but,
what in this situation is usually more important, to supplement, explain,
and give different perspective to the facts upon which the agency relies."208 The applicable principle is that stated in section 7(d) of the
federal Administrative Procedure Act: 'Where any agency decision
rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence
in the record, any party shall on timely request be afforded an opportunity to show the contrary."204
Institutional decisions. Ten years ago, discussions of the process of
administrative decision were centered upon the celebrated Morgan

201 Id. at
202 Ibid.

560.

208 RE.PORT 01' THB ATTORNllY GENERAL'S CoM:MITI'BE 72.
204 Section 9(4) of the. Model State APA contains an analogous

provision. See Lakemore v. Brown, (Em. Ct. App. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 355, dealing with a similar provision
in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.
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cases,205 the last of which had been decided by the Supreme Court in
1941. The decision of the Court in the fourth Morgan case had, however, made it clear that little, if any, practical effect could be given to
its earlier Morgan decisions. In the first Morgan case, Chief Justice
Hughes had enunciated the basic rule that an administrative decision
is invalid unless the deciding official has considered the evidence and
arguments which have been presented by the parties. "That duty [i.e.,
of decision] cannot be performed by one who has not considered evidence or argument. It is not an impersonal obligation. It is a duty akin
to that of a judge. The one who decides must hear." 206
In the fourth Morgan case, the Court held that the interrogation
of deciding officials within the agency to determine the processes by
which they had reached their decisions was improper. "Just as a judge
cannot be subjected to such a scrutiny," declared Justice Frankfurter,
"... so the integrity of the administrative process must be equally
respected."207 Several more recent decisions have applied this principle.
To the contention that the National Labor Relations Board had not read
or considered the evidence, the Court of Appeals for the Third Ci:r;cuit
replied, 'We may not assume that the Board neither considered the
evidence nor read the respondent's brief . . ., nor may we in such circumstances 'probe the mental processes' of the Board in reaching [its]
conclusions."208 And, with regard to a similar contention concerning
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia declared, 'We are not concerned with the manner
in which the Commission gives consideration to the record; it is enough
if it certifies that consideration has been given and that its findings arise
therefrom. "209
205 Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 56 S.Ct. 906 (1936); Morgan v. United
States, 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773 (1938); United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 59 S.Ct.
795 (1939); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 61 S.Ct. 999 (1941).
200 Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 at 481. For recent state cases involving
the Morgan rule, see Horsman Dolls v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 134
N.J.L. 77, 45 A. (2d) 681 (1945); State Labor Relations Board v. Greif Realty Corp., 71
N.Y.S. (2d) 91 (1947); Pettiford v. Board of Education, 218 S.C. 322, 62 S.E. (2d) 780
(1950); Webster v. Texas & Pacific Motor Co., 140 Tex. 131, 166 S.W. (2d) 75 (1942);
Crow v. Industrial Comm., 104 Utah 333, 140 P. (2d) 321 (1943); State v. Board of
Commissioners, 28 Wash. (2d) 891, 184 P. (2d) 577 (1947).
201 United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 at 422.
208 National Labor Relations Board v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, (3d Cir. 1942)
128 F. (2d) 39 at 48.
209 Norris and Hirschberg v. Securities & Exchange Commission, (D.C. Cir. 1947)
163 F. (2d) 689 at 693. See, similarly, Civil Service Comm. v. Board of Health, 111 Colo.
109, 138 P. (2d) 934 (1943); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 9
N.J. Super. 124, 75 A. (2d) 284 (1950).
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A similar problem was presented in National Labor Relations Board
Donnelly Garment Co.,210 which has already been discussed with
regard to the problem of bias. In that case, the NLRB order was
originally denied enforcement because of the Board's refusal to allow
the employer to present certain testimony. On remand, the examiner
heard some of the proof rejected in the earlier proceeding, but declined
to hear the rest on the ground that it would be merely cumulative. On
review of the Board's second order, the lower court concluded that
neither the examiner nor the Board took the new testimony into account
in reaching the .findings on which the second order was based. Primarily on that basis, the court held that a full hearing was denied. Justice Frankfurter, in reversing, held that this conclusion was wholly
unwarranted, in view of the Board's statement in its decision that it
had carefully considered "all of the evidence." "It is a grave responsibility," the opinion asserts, "to conclude that in admitting the testimony
of the Company's employees, the Board went through a mere pretense
of obedience to the Court's direction, and heard the testimony with a
deaf ear and a closed mind. In light of the authority with which Congress has endowed the Board, and with due regard to the conscientiousness which we must attribute to another branch of the Government, we
cannot reject its explicit avowal that it did take into account evidence
which it should have considered unless an examination of the whole
record puts its acceptance beyond reason." 211
It cannot be denied that, in effect, decisions like those just discussed
destroy the efficacy of the principle of the .first Morgan case. Unless
the private party is permitted to examine the deciding official on his
decision process, it is difficult to see how he c;:an possibly prove his claim
that the one who decided did not hear. 212 There are, however, strong
considerations on the other side. It has been argued that if the Secretary of Agriculture "were to give to every order which he signs the
consideration which the [.first] Morgan case requires, he would probably have to devote all his time to the conduct of matters which must
be considered petty from a national viewpoint."213 But if the mental
processes of the Secretary could be probed in later court proceedings,
he would then most certainly not have the time which Morgan I
requires. Most of his time would be occupied in judicial proceedings
11.

210

330 U.S. 219, 67 S.Ct. 756 (1947). .

211 Id. at 229.
212 See note, 36 CoL. L. Rl!v. 1156 at 1157 (1936).
21s Feller, ''Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal Administrative Law," 47
YALE L.J. 647 at 662 (1938).
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to determine whether he had actually complied with the principle of
the :first Morgan case.
From a practical point of view, the judicial position since the Morgan cases thus seem justified. A reviewing court cannot probe the
mental processes of an administrative tribunal any more than it can
those of a trial court. Its function is to determine whether the evidence
in the record supports the agency :findings, not to determine whether
the agency in fact considered that evidence. "According to an early
English judge, 'The devil himself knoweth not the mind of man,' and
a modern reviewing court is not much better equipped to lay bare
unexposed mental processes."214
At the same time, however, the problem with which the Supreme
Court sought to deal in the :first two Morgan cases still remains. The
institutional administrative decision, when carried to the extent it often
is, may cause private parties to lose faith in the justice of administrative
decisions. "How is it to be expected that a party against whom a decision has been given in a hole-and-corner fashion ... should believe that
he has had justice?"215 As the conduct of an administrative hearing
"becomes divorced from the responsibility for decision two undesirable
consequences ensue. The hearing itself degenerates and the decision
becomes anonymous." 216 That the vicarious process of decision prevalent in the administrative :field is not conducive to public confidence
is shown by the many criticisms which have been directed against it. As
Dean Landis has succinctly put it, if one coming before an administrative tribunal does not know who is going to decide his case "and if he
has his suspicion that it is going to be decided by some two-pence-half
penny law clerk down the line, you will never get anywhere, in my
judgment, with bringing into existence a feeling that justice is being
done." 217
The federal Administrative Procedure Act seeks to do away with
these difficulties by assimilating the roles of hearing and deciding officers within the agency to those of trial and appellate courts, under
provisions which have already been discussed. The question whether
provisions for initial decisions by the hearing officer, analogous to those
rendered by a trial judge, such as those contained in section 8(a) of
the federal Administrative Procedure Act, violate the rule of the :first
Morgan case was considered in an interesting California case in 1947.
214 National Labor Relations Board v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219 at 229.
215 HEwART, THB NEw DESPOTISM 48 (1929).
216REPORT OF THB A'ITORNEY GENERAL'S CoMMin'EE 45.
217 In Symposium on Administrative Law, 9 AM. L. SCHOOL REv. 139 at 182 (1939).
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The California Administrative Procedure Act, in a section comparable
to that of the federal act, provides: "If a contested case is heard by a
hearing officer alone, he shall prepare a proposed decision in such form
that it may be adopted as the decision in the case.... The agency itself
may adopt the proposed decision in its entirety...." 218 In the case
referred to, the agency concerned-the Insurance Commissioner-had
adopted the proposed decision of the hearing officer, without hearing
any evidence or .first reading the record. But, says the court, this was
the very type of procedure which the legislature intended should be
followed. The very aim of the statute here was to increase the responsibility of the hearing officer- to elevate him from the role of mere
adviser to that of initial judge--by giving him the authority to formulate what might prove to be the .final administrative decision in the
proceeding. Nor did this procedure violate due process under the principle of the first Morgan case. The Morgan cases "cannot be interpreted to mean that, where a fair trial is required by the statute before
a fair and impartial hearing officer who is required by the statute to
weigh and appraise the evidence and to prepare a proposed decision,
the Legislature cannot provide that the administrative agency may adopt
his proposed decision without reading the record."219
Timing of Judicial Relief
Primary jurisdiction. If there is one principle which the federal
courts have been consistent in their application of, it has been that of
primary administrative jurisdiction enunciated by Justice White in the
celebrated Texas & Paci-fie Ry. case.220 Under it, an "administrative
agency is not only an operating instrumentality but it is .usually the primary and exclusive tribunal of first resort. This means [that] . . .
original jurisdiction conferred upon [the agency] is lost to the courts
whose function in those cases is limited to judicial review . . . unless
the statutory provisions preserve the jurisdiction of other tribunals."221
That the primary jurisdiction doctrine is one which is essential
to the effective functioning of the administrative process-it has,
indeed, been termed the "keystone of the arch of administrative
regulation" 222-is today disputed by few. "Certainly," as it has been
expressed by a New York court, "sound policy would seem to dictate that
218 Cal. Govt. Code (Deering, 1951) §ll517(b).
219 Hohreiter v. Garrison, 81 Cal. App. (2d) 384
220 Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil

at 401, 184 P. (2d) 323 (1947).
Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 S.Ct. 350

(1907).
221
222

McFARLAND AND VANDERBILT, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, 2d ed., 662 (1952).
Note, 51 HARv. L. REv. 1251 (1938).
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courts should not interfere ... in matters highly technical in character
and often far reaching in their economic consequences until they have
been considered and passed upon by the trained body established for
that very purpose and especially equipped to examine into the intricate
facts commonly involved in [administrative] problems."223 At the same
time, however, one may wonder whether there has not been a tendency
in the federal courts in recent years to carry the primary jurisdiction
doctrine too far. A few illustrative cases will serve to show this.
In S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transport Assn.,224 plaintiff, a non-scheduled
interstate air carrier brought suit under the antitrust laws against an
association of regularly certified air carriers. Alleging that defendant
airlines conspired to monopolize air-borne commerce, hindered and prevented plaintiff from obtaining ticket agencies, discredited plaintiff,
prevented competition, offered to cut prices until competition was
eliminated, and refused vital maintenance at airports, the complaint
asked for injunctive relief and for treble damages. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the provisions of the Civil
Aeronautics Act covered the dominant facts alleged and that the Civil
Aeronautics Board consequently had primary jurisdiction to issue cease
and desist orders against the unfair methods of competition alleged. It
is true that the Board may ultimately determine that it lacks jurisdiction
over certain phases of the complaint. But until it does so, recourse may
not be had to the courts. The prayer for treble damages, said the court,
presented a different problem. The Civil Aeronautics Board has no
power to award damages. The district courts are consequently not
deprived of jurisdiction of an air carrier's suit for treble damages for
violation of the antitrust laws.
Where does this leave the private party who seeks relief from the
unfair methods alleged? According to the court, the district court is to
retain jurisdiction of the antitrust suit while plaintiff seeks his remedies
from the Board. After the Board decides, the court will have the benefit
of its decision in determining whether to award damages. The court
admitted that this might make for considerable delay, but it saw no
other way out. "But absent specific congressional action to deal with
the problem, we see no other way in which to accommodate these
conllicting statutory schemes and the principles which follow in their
wake."225
2 23 Croydon

Syndicate v. Consolidated Edison Co., 72 N.Y.S. (2d) 846 at 848-849

(1947).
224 (D.C. Cir.
221, Id. at 664.

1951) 191 F. (2d) 658.
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It is difficult to see why, in a case like this, the plaintiff cannot get
his decision in one tribunal. As stated by Judge Clark, who concurred,226 there is no sound reason why the plaintiff should be required
to split his cause of action by obtaining a cease and desist order from
the Board before coming into court to seek damages. Since the district
court clearly has jurisdiction to award damages, it should afford complete relief in the one action. To require plaintiff to go first to the
Board, then to the court, is but to require a needless duplication of
effort on his part. Truly, as Justice Frankfurter said, "this danger if
not likelihood of thus marching the king's men up the hill and then
marching them down again seems to me a mode of judicial administration to which I cannot yield concurrence."227
With the case just discussed should be compared the decision of
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Lichten v. Eastern
Airlines.228 Plaintiff there brought an action against an air carrier for the
loss of jewelry contained in a bag checked with defendant. The tariff
rules of the carrier, which were filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board,
provided that the carrier was not to be liable for the loss of jewelry.
The court held that plaintiff's complaint was subject to a motion for
summary judgment. The court was without jurisdiction until plaintiff
applied to the Board for a ruling on the legality of the carrier's rule.
Here, too, it would seem that the court is carrying the primary
jurisdiction doctrine too far. The plaintiff's case was based upon the
proposition that the tariff rule which excludes all liability for the loss
of jewelry is void. This is a pure contention of law, and it has often
been held that, where only such questions are involved, the primary
jurisdiction doctrine does not apply. What is to be gained here, other
than delay, by requiring plaintiff to resort to the CAB for a decision on
the legality of the rule which would then be subject to full judicial
review?
If the questions involved in a case fall within the competence of an
administrative agency, the federal courts have thus insisted upon the
fact that the agency has exclusive jurisdiction. The courts cannot take
cognizance of the matter until the agency has itself determined those
questions. Nor, under the federal view, does it make any difference
that the remedy sought in the court is one which it is beyond the power
of the agency to accord. 229
22s Id. at 665.
221 City

of Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685 at 694, 64 S.Ct. 327 (1944).

22s (2d Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 939.

229 But compare Georgia v.
(1945).

Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 ai: 455, 65 S.Ct. 716
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It was on this point that the Texas court recently differed with the
federal cases just discussed. The case before it involved an action by
an employer against a union for damages and injunctive relief based
upon allegations of a conspiracy to destroy the employer's business by
the use of unfair lists, picketing, and secondary boycotts, because the
employer would not engage in prohibited unfair labor practices. Defendants contended that the employer should have pursued its administrative remedies in the National Labor Relations Board to exhaustion
before resorting to the courts. The court rejected this contention, since
the NLRB could not determine plaintiff's claim for damages. Resort
to the administrative process, reads the opinion, is required only when
the agency can give adequate relief. "It is no answer to say that
damages could have been sought in one forum and injunctive relief in
another, for this 'would involve the bringing of separate and independent suits, productive of multiplicity and vexation.' "230
The view of the Texas court seems preferable to that of the federal
cases which have been discussed. Why should the plaintiff have to
bring two actions, when the whole trend of our law, since the merger
of law and equity, has been away from artificial dichotomizations of
remedial justice? The result of requiring plaintiff first to seek administrative relief in cases of this type has been well stated by Circuit Judge
Frank in a recent dissent. "If 'exhaustion of administrative remedies' is
demanded in a case like this, the result will be the exhaustion of litigants. To say that plaintiff's suit is premature suggests that a mature
suit is a ripe one, and recalls Rabelais' Judge Bridlegoose: he insisted
that litigation is like fruit which must not be picked until it has ripened;
he explained that he long delayed each of his decisions because, as a
consequence, neither party to any suit cared how it ended. But Bridlegoose was a French judge of a bygone era, and it is an ancient, but still
prized, Anglo-American principle, embodied in the Bill of Rights of
many of our States, that every citizen ought to obtain 'justice promptly
and without delay.' To postpone suit here until the Board considers
whether it had authority is to indulge in a 'delaying formalism,' an 'idle
form,' to require the sort of nugatory act with which courts dispense in
all sorts of situations.''231
Exhaustion of administrative remedies. In Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 232 the Supreme Court had held that the rule
230 Texas Federation of Labor v. Brown & Root, (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) 246 S.W.
(2d) 938 at 941.
231 Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, (2d Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 939 at 948.
232 303 U.S. 41, 58 S.Ct. 459 (1938).
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requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies before recourse
may be had to the courts was applicable even where it was claimed
that the agency concerned had no jurisdiction in the particular case.
Even in such a case, judicial intervention could not be obtained until
the stage of final agency action. During the past decade, the Court has
continued strictly to apply the rule of the Myers case. An illustrative
case is Macauley v. Waterman S. S. Corp.,233 which involved the applicability of the Renegotiation Act. That act authorized the Chairman
of the Maritime Commission to renegotiate war contracts made with
the Commission for purposes of eliminating excessive profits. The
Price Adjustment Board of that Commission notified the Waterman
Corporation that it had been assigned to renegotiate Waterman's contracts with the Commission, and requested Waterman to attend an
initial conference and to supply information concerning those contracts.
Waterman denied the authority of the Board to renegotiate these contracts on the ground that they had been made with the British Ministry
of War Transport and not with the Maritime Commission. The Price
Adjustment Board insisted that while the contracts had been signed
with the British Ministry for "technical reasons," they had been negotiated with Waterman by the Maritime Commission on behalf of the
United States Government, and that they were therefore renegotiable
contracts with the Commission. Waterman refused to furnish the
information requested and brought suit in the district court against the
Chairman of the Maritime Commission and the Price Adjustment
Board seeking a declaratory judgment that the contracts were not subject to the Renegotiation Act and an injunction prohibiting further
renegotiation proceedings involving them.
The Supreme Court held that under the Myers case the district
court lacked power to grant relief even though there was no dispute
here as to the evidentiary facts but only as to the legal consequences to
be drawn from them. "Just as in the Myers case," said Justice Black,
"the claim here is that the contracts are not covered by the applicable
statute.... In order to grant the injunction sought the District Court
would have to decide this issue in the first instance. Whether it ever
can do so or not, it cannot now decide questions of coverage when the
administrative agencies authorized to do so have not yet made their
determination. Here, just as in the Myers case, the administrative
process, far from being exhausted, had hardly begun."234
233

234

327 U.S. 540, 66 S.Ct. 712 (1946).
Id. at 544.
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In the Myers and Waterman cases, the private party sought injunctive relief on the ground that the particular case did not come within
the statutory jurisdiction of the agency concerned. Does the doctrine
of those cases apply as well to bar such relief where the asserted lack
of jurisdiction is based upon a claim of unconstitutionality? In Wade
285
11. Stimson,
plaintiffs sought to restrain the enforcement of a claim
arising under the Renegotiation Act, the contention of the plaintiffs
being that the statute was unconstitutional. During the war, plaintiffs
had entered into numerous contracts to manufacture precision tools
and dies. These contracts were not directly with the United States and
for the purposes of renegotiation the status of the plaintiffs was that of
subcontractors only. In 1944, the Under Secretary of War determined
that during 1942 the plaintiffs realized excessive profits in the sum of
over $400,000 and directed a refund to the United States of this
amount. Upon the failure of the plaintiffs to make this refund, the
government directed prime contractors, doing business with the government, to withhold for the account of the United States sums otherwise
payable to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claimed that the renegotiation law was
unconstitutional as applied to them and sought injunctive relief,
although the statute permitted them to have the administrative determination of excessive profits redetermined in a de novo proceeding
before the Tax Court. The district court denied relief, citing the Myers
and Waterman cases. The fact that it was not statutory but constitutional lack of jurisdiction upon which the claim for relief was based did
not change the application of the exhaustion of remedies rule. 286 Thus,
even where the statute sought to be applied and enforced by the administrative agency is challenged upon constitutional grounds, completion
of the administrative remedy is held to be a prerequisite to injunctive
relief. 287
The result in the Wade case is not compelled by the Myers doctrine.
Even if one feels that that doctrine is essential to effective administration, one may still seek to limit its application to cases where statutory
jurisdiction is questioned. As stated by the Massachusetts court, in a
case which expressly follows the holding of the Myers case insofar as
statutory administrative jurisdiction is concerned: "Where an administrative board is created by or is acting under a statute that is violative
(D.C. D.C. 1946) 65 F. Supp. 277, affd. 331 U.S. 793, 67 S.Ct. 1727 (1947).
similarly, Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 at
775-776, 67 S.Ct. 1493 (1947); Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Reconstruction Finance
Corp., (9th Cir. 1949) 178 F. (2d) 854 at 858.
287 United States v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. (2d) 189, 120 P. (2d) 26 (1941).
2s5

286 See,
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of the Federal or a State Constitution . . . then one may challenge the
jurisdiction of the board by invoking the aid of the courts and need not
wait until the board has made a final order."238 It is usually said that
the Myers doctrine is necessary if the administrative process is adequately to carry out the tasks which the legislature has assigned to it.
Otherwise, it is argued, the jurisdictional issue can be raised in most
cases as a device to delay effective administrative action. But this surely
does not apply with the same force where questions of constitutional
jurisdiction are involved. Such questions can normally be raised in
but a relatively few cases. Once the constitutionality of a particular
statute is upheld, those subject to the act can no longer raise that issue,
much as they might wish to do so for the purpose of obstructing administrative efficiency. In addition, if the Myers doctrine is based, as it in
large part is, upon the judicial hesitancy to act in a particular case without the aid of administrative expertise as expressed in a prior agency
decision, then this, too, should not operate where constitutional questions are concerned. The considerations which lead courts to defer to
administrative determinations in most cases do not apply to such questions. With regard to them, the advantages of expertise are normally
with the judge rather than the administrator.
It is true that the Myers rule is not applied by the federal courts
in cases where the administrative remedy which is available is "futile
and nugatory."239 And there are indications in a significant recent case
that, in cases other than those involving the exercise of administrative
investigatory powers, where it is the agency itself which seeks the aid of
the courts, the courts can consider the jurisdictional issue before granting relief. 240 But these cases aside, the Myers rule is strictly adhered to
in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, even where strong arguments can be made for distinguishing the particular case.241
It should, however, be noted that the Myers rule has been rejected
by a number of state courts, including, in recent years, the highest
courts of New York2 42 and New Jersey. 243 Of especial interest is a
288 St. Luke's Hospital v. Labor Relations Commission, 320 Mass. 467 at 470, 70
N.E. (2d) 10 (1946).
289 United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730 at 739, 64 S.Ct. 820 (1944). See Order
of Railway Conductors v. Swan, 329 U.S. 520, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947), for an application
of this principle.
.
240Federal Power Commission v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 337 U.S. 498, 69
S.Ct. 1251 (1949).
241 See, e.g., Otis & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, (D.C. Cir. 1949)
176 F. (2d) 34, revd. 338 U.S. 843, 70 S.Ct. 89 (1949); Arkansas Power and Light Co.
v. Federal Power Commission, (D.C. Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 821, revd. 330 U.S. 802,
67 S.Ct. 963 (1947).
242 New York Post Corp. v. Kelley, 296 N.Y. 178, 71 N.E. (2d) 456 (1947).
248 Ward v. Keenan, 3 N.J. 298, 70 A. (2d) 77 (1949).
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1949 decision of the latter court, which expressly refuses to follow the
federal rule. "Where the question of jurisdiction," asserted Vanderbilt,
C. J., "depends, as it often does, on questions of fact, and where the
Federal courts apply their version of the 'substantial evidence' rule,
which often signifies something falling far short of the weight of the
evidence, the ultimate benefits of judicial review of the question of
jurisdiction may be little more than pro forma . ... This point of view is
at variance with the Rule of Law as enforced in this State...."244 To
put the court's view another way, the narrowness of review upon the
jurisdictional issue renders judicial intervention at this stage necessary
if the private party is ever to get an adequate hearing upon that issue.
Under the decision of the New Jersey court, judicial relief can be
obtained even though administrative remedies have not been exhausted
when the jurisdiction of the agency is challenged "for the obvious
reason that if the question of jurisdiction were resolved against the
statutory tribunal the parties would be spared the vexation of a useless
hearing...."245
According to the federal courts, the expense and annoyance involved
in an administrative hearing are not enough to justify judicial intervention to stop an agency from acting, even though it is alleged that the
agency is without jurisdiction in the premises. "The justification for
the burden upon the individual of subjecting him to such [administrative] proceedings instead of stopping them at the outset by injunctive
or other relief in the courts," declared Judge Augustus N. Hand, "lies
in the absence of an alternative consistent with the orderly conduct
of the government's business ...."246 The jurisdictional issue can be
raised in practically every case and, if a judicial hearing could be obtained at the outset upon the mere allegation of lack of jurisdiction, the
injunction or declaratory judgment action might be widely used as a
device to delay effective administration.
One wonders whether this does not lead to undue sacrifice of the
private interest. "We have waited too long and wasted too much time
and money with administrative proceedings that drag on in excess of
two years under procedures that are manifestly improper; it is time to
reassess the situation and make provision to avoid a continuation of an
unjust and unconscionable practice. More than one private litigant has
died on the vine in an attempt to exhaust an inexorably inexhaustible
(in time) administrative remedy, when had there been access to the
2« Id. at 303.
245 Id.

at 308.

246 United

States v. Kauten, (2d Cir. 1943) 133 F. (2d) 703 at 706.
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courts the manifest justice of his case would have removed the
sti.gma. "247
Preclusion of Review
Legislative silence. To determine whether judicial review of particular administrative action is available, one must first look to the applicable statutes. The availability of review in a given case depends
primarily upon the provisions which the legislature has seen fit to make
in the matter. The absence of statutory provisions for review does not,
however, necessarily mean that access to the judiciary is barred. Even
in the absence of statutes, Anglo-American courts have developed means
for controlling administrative officers in their relation to private right. 248
Such control is effected largely through the so-called "extraordinary"
or "prerogative" writs and injunctions and their present-day equivalents.
The mere fact that one starts in a particular case with a statute which
makes no provision for judicial review is consequently not decisive.
· "For the silence of Congress as to judicial review is not necessarily to
be construed as a denial of the power of the federal courts to grant
relief in the exercise of the general jurisdiction which Congress has
conferred upon them."249
This basic principle has become established in the jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court during the past ten years. The leading case is
Stark v. Wickard,250 decided in 1944. The Secretary of Agriculture,
acting under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, had
promulgated an order regulating the marketing of milk in the Greater
Boston area. The order provided for fixing minimum prices to be paid
to producers, and the prescribed formula authorized a deduction for
certain payments to cooperatives. Producers, claiming that promulgation of the deduction provision was beyond the Secretary's statutory
power, brought suit in the district court to enjoin him from carrying
out the challenged portion of the order. The majority of the Court held
that the suit could be maintained, even conceding that there was no
direct judicial review granted by this statute for these proceedings.
"Here, there is no forum," reads the opinion of Justice Reed, "other
than the ordinary courts, to hear this complaint."251 The silence of
247 Netterville,

''The Administrative Procedure Act: A Study in Interpretation," 20

GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 at 85-86 (1951).
248 REPoRT ol' THE AnoRNEY GENERAL's CoMMI'ITEE 80.
249Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 at 120, 66 S.Ct. 423
2110 321 U.S. 288, 64 S.Ct. 559 (1944).
251 Id. at 309.

(1946).
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Congress is not to be construed as indicating a legislative intent to
preclude review. The courts, in such cases, may exercise the inherent
review power which they possess through the delegation to them of
the "judicial power" under the Constitution. 'When Congress passes
an act empowering administrative agencies to carry on governmental
activities, the power of those agencies is circumscribed by the authority
granted. This permits the courts to participate in law enforcement
entrusted to administrative bodies only to the extent necessary to protect
justiciable individual rights against administrative action fairly beyond
the granted powers. The responsibility of determining the limits of
statutory grants of authority in such instances is a judicial function
entrusted to the courts by Congress by the statutes establishing courts
and marking their jurisdiction."252
The rule that judicial review is not precluded merely by legislative
silence on the subject has been reaffirmed by the Court in several more
recent cases.253 It is clearly the proper starting point for a system based
upon the rule of law. To hold otherwise would mean that, in the
absence of statutory review provisions, an administrative order is final
and not reviewable by any court even though entered arbitrarily, without substantial supporting evidence, and in defiance of law. "Such a
sweeping contention for administrative finality is out of harmony with
the general legislative pattern of administrative and judicial relationships."254 The need for judicial control such as that exercised by the
majority of the Court in Stark v. Wickard has been emphasized in
strong language by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
"If the judiciary has no power in such matter, the only practical restraint
would be the self-restraint of the executive branch. Such a result is
foreign to our concept of the division of the powers of government."2156
Implied preclusion. One of the important developments in federal
administrative law has been the tendency of the Supreme Court in some
cases to find a legislative intent to preclude review even though access
to the courts is not expressly barred in the relevant statute. An example
of this is to be found in Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation
Board. 256 That case dealt with the problem of whether the certification
252 Id.

at 309-310.
States v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 337 U.S. 426, 69 S.Ct. 1410
(1949); Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 67 S.Ct. 411 (1947); Estep v.
United States, 327 U.S. 114, 66 S.Ct. 423 (1946).
254 United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 337 U.S. 426 at 433-434, 69
S.Ct. 1410 (1949).
2 55 Fleming v. Moberly Mille Products Co., (D.C. Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 259 at 265.
2116 320 U.S. 297, 64 S.Ct. 95 (1943).
211 3 United
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of representatives for collective bargaining by the National Mediation
Board was subject to judicial review. The Cc5mt held that it was not,
asserting that the Railway Labor Act impliedly precluded review. "...
the intent seems plain-the dispute was to reach its last terminal point
when the administrative finding was made. There was to be no dragging out of the controversy into other tribunals of law.... The language of the act read in light of [the legislative] history supports the
view that Congress gave administrative action under §2, Ninth, a finality which it denied administrative action under the other sections of
the Act."257
The Switchmen's Union case established that the courts have no
jurisdiction to review a certification by the National Mediation Board.
The implications of that case are, however, much broader, for the
language of the National Labor Relations Act parallels that of the
Railway Labor Act, and would seem to compel a similar result under
the National Labor Relations Act. The Switchmen's Union doctrine
was applied to certifications by the National Labor Relations Board in
Millis v. Inland Empire District Council, where the court he1d that
NLRB certifications could not be reviewed except in the limited situation provided for by section 9(d) of the Labor Relations Act. "In
American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board258
... , the Supreme Court expressly reserved the question whether the
Board's mere certification of collective bargaining representatives could
be reviewed in a suit like the present one. But we think the question
is now foreclosed by Switchmen's Union of North America v. National
. . Board...."2iso
Mediat1on
The doctrine of the Switchmen's Union case appears to run counter
to the nor,mal rule of our law, exemplified by cases like Stark v. Wickard,260 discussed above, under which, even in the absence of statutory
provisions, our courts can afford relief against administrative action
interfering with the person or property of private citizens. Its effect
upon the party seeking review is clearly a drastic one. In the Switchmen's Union case, petitioner was a union which lost an election held
by the National Mediation Board. The Board had designated all of
the yardmen of the rail lines operated by the New York Central system
as the bargaining unit. Petitioner contended that, under the statute,
257 Id. at 305-306. The rule of the Switchmen's. Union case is not changed by the
federal APA. Kirkland v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., (D.C. Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 529.
258 308 U.S. 401, 60 S.Ct. 300 (1940).
259 (D.C. Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 539. Compare Inland Empire Council v. Millis,
325 U.S. 697 at 700, 65 S.Ct. 1316 (1945).
200 321 U.S. 288, 64 S.Ct. 559 (1944).
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yardmen of certain designated parts of the system should be permitted
to vote for separate representatives instead of being compelled to take
part in a system-wide election. This raised a substantial question of
statutory interpretation,261 but, under the Supreme Court's decision,
the Board's determination of it could not be challenged by petitioner
in a reviewing court. It is true that certification orders can be challenged
indirectly upon review of orders in unfair labor practice proceedings.
But this is of little aid to those really concerned with having such
certifications set aside, namely, the minority union like petitioner in
the Switchmen's Union case.
The doctrine of implied preclusion of review is one which should
be applied most sparingly. The courts should hesitate before :finding a
legislative intent to bar recourse to the courts, and should not do so
unless the relevant statute affirmatively indicates an intent that the
particular administrative act shall not be reviewable. The Supreme
Court has, however, applied the doctrine of implied preclusion to situations where the congressional intent to bar review was not clearly expressed. An example of this type of case is Chicago & Southern Air
Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp. 262 Section 801 of the Civil Aeronautics
Act provides that, when a foreign air carrier asks for any permit, or a
citizen carrier applies for a certificate to engage in any overseas or
foreign air transportation, any decision, either to grant or to deny, is to
be subject to the approval of the President. Section I 006(a) of the act
subjects to judicial review "any order ... issued by the Board under
this act, except any order in respect of any foreign air carrier, subject to
the approval of the President as provided in section 801." The Civil
Aeronautics Board, with express approval of the President, issued an
order which denied petitioner, a citizen carrier, a certificate of convenience and necessity for an overseas air route and granted one to a rival
applicant. Petitioner filed a petition for review under section 1006(a),
charging that the Board had no substantial evidence to support its
:findings. The Board moved to dismiss on the ground that, since the
order required and had the approval of the President, it was not reviewable.
The Court, by a bare majority, agreed with the contentions of the
Board. Such orders "are not mature and are therefore not susceptible
to judicial review at any time before they are finalized by presidential
approval. After such approval has been given, the final orders embody
I.Aw 824 (1951).
U.S. 103, 68 S.Ct. 431 (1948).

261 See DAVIS, AnMINisTRATIVl!
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presidential discretion as to political matters beyond the competence of
the courts to adjudicate."263 In effect, the Court held that, because of
the requirement of presidential approval, judicial review under section
1006 was impliedly precluded, although it conceded "that a literal reading of §1006 subjects this order to re-examination by the courts."264
One wonders, however, whether the Court is justified in thus expanding the doctrine of implied preclusion of review. The policy of our law
in favor of judicial review is a fundamental one, and should not give
way where statutory provisions such as those in the Waterman case are
involved, where the intent of the legislature seems to be, if anything, to
allow review.
But, asserts the Court, these considerationi; do not apply in the
instant case, for the requirement of presidential approval bars us from
acting, even though petitioner requests us only to review the action of
the Board. Before the approval of the President the Board's order is
merely a recommendation, not a "final" order subject to review. When
the President has acted, on the other hand, for the Court to intervene
would be to review the discretion of the Chief Executive.
Yet, as Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissent, "review of the
President's action does not result from reading the statute in the way it
is written. Congress made reviewable by the courts only orders 'issued
by the Board under this act.' Those orders can be reviewed without
reference to any conduct of the President, for that part of the orders
which is the work of the Board is plainly identifiable."265 The President
is concerned only with the impact of the order on foreign relations or
military affairs. Civil Aeronautics Board orders under section 80 I do
not, however, necessarily have any impact on these matters, and yet may
vitally affect private rights. "A result more consonant with legislative
intent and with our background of judicial supremacy would have been
a decision in the principal case that the appellate courts may review the
orders issued by the Board to the extent of their purely private repercussions. "266
Express preclusion. In particular cases, the legislature may not
only not make specific provision for review of administrative action,.but
may expressly provide that judicial review is to be precluded. An example of the type of conclusiveness provision which exists in American
268 Id. at
264 Id. at
265 Id. at
266 Note,

114.
110.
115.
61 HARv. L. R:!!v. 1053 at 1054 (1948).
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statutes is to be found in the Immigration Act of 1917. That law, which
authorizes the deportation of aliens who come within its provisions,
states that the administrative decision in particular deportation cases
"shall be final." If interpreted literally, such a provision for administrative £nality would place the administrative decision in a conclusive
position and bar all recourse to the courts.
The courts in this country have, however, consistently refused to
give literal effect to provisions for administrative conclusiveness, such
as that contained in the deportation statute. As stated by a federal
court in 1948, "Nevertheless, and in spite of such language, it is perfectly clear that it [i.e., the administrative decision] is not final in the
sense that courts cannot do anything about it."267 It has long been
established that an alien against whom a deportation order has been
issued could obtain a judicial decision on the legality of that order in
a habeas corpus proceeding. Thus, "[w]hile it might look as though
judicial review were precluded by the giving to the deportation order
the air of finality, in practice such finality never existed because of the
availability of habeas corpus."268
It may be objected that the courts in this country, in refusing literally to interpret a provision such as that in the deportation statute, are
violating the correct canons of statutory construction. Yet, as Justice
Frankfurter has aptly pointed out, "It is true also of Acts of Congress
that 'The letter killeth.' . . . in enacting legislation Congress is not
engaged in a scientific process which takes account of every contingency.
Its laws are not to be read as though every i has to be dotted and every
t crossed."269
To apply the rigid rule of literal construction in these cases would
be to free the administrative agencies concerned from all judicial control. Such complete preclusion of review, if objectionable anywhere,
would seem to be so particularly in deportation proceedings, "where
we frequently meet with a voteless class of litigants who not only lack
the inB.uence of citizens, but who are strangers to the laws and customs
in which they find themselves involved and who often do not even
understand the tongue in which they are accused." 270
267

United States ex rel. Trinler v. Carusi, (3d Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 457 at 460.
at 461. Under McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 71 S.Ct. 224 (1950),
review of a deportation order may also be obtained in a declaratory judgment proceeding.
2 6 9 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 at 548, 70 S.Ct. 309
(1950).
210 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 at 46, 70 S.Ct. 445 (1950).
268 Id.
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The approach of the deportation cases upon this point is basically
similar to that followed by the Supreme Court in Estep v. United
States. 271 In that case, the Court held that a provision that the administrative order at issue should be "£nal" did not place such order beyond
judicial control. "It is only orders 'within their respective jurisdictions'
that are made final," 212 Justice Douglas asserted, and the jurisdictional
question is a judicial question. To hold otherwise would be to impute
an intent to the legislature to depart drastically from our normal tradition of judicial control of legality, in a case where the legislative intent
has not been expressed unequivocally. "We cannot readily infer that
Congress departed so far from the traditional concepts of a fair trial
when it made the actions of the local boards 'final' ...."273
The result in these cases, in both the federal and state courts, is
not unlike that which has been noted in cases where the legislature has
been silent with regard to judicial review. In both cases, the courts
refuse to find a legislative intent to preclude review. To hold otherwise
might, indeed, raise a difficult constitutional question. As it was recently expressed by the highest court of Maryland, a statutory provision
for administrative conclusiveness "cannot override the basic principle
that the Legislature cannot divest the courts of their inherent power to
review the actions of administrative agencies which are illegal, arbitrary,
or unreasonable and which impair personal or property rights." 274
"Privilege" cases. It should, however, be noted that the principle in
favor of the availability of review, which is the basic principle of our
administrative law, even in the face of statutory provisions which seemingly preclude review, has not been applied in an important category
of cases. These are the cases involving so-called grants, benefits, or
"privileges," where the state accords to the individual something to
which he has no pre-existing legal right. In these "privilege" cases, a
statutory provision for administrative conclusiveness is given effect by
our courts so as to exclude judicial review.
As good an example as any of a provision for conclusiveness in the
field of state benefits is to be found in the statute applicable to the Veterans' Administration. It provides that the decisions of that agency on
claims for benefits under the statutory schemes administered by it "shall
be final and conclusive and no other official or any court of the United
211327 U.S. 114, 66 S.Ct. 423 (1946).
212 Id. at 120.
273 Id. at 122.
274 Johnstown Coal & Coke Co. v. Dishong, (Md. 1951) 84 A. (2d) 847 at 850.
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States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decisions." 275
The purpose of this provision appears to have been to remove the possibility of judicial relief in the cases covered by it.276 And, as stated on
one federal case, "the authority of Congress to withhold judicial review
here is now beyond question. Veterans' benefits are mere gratuities
and 'the grant of them creates no vested right.' "277 In these cases,
Justice Stone has asserted, "The United States is not, by the creation
of claims against itself, bound to provide a remedy in the courts. It may
withhold all remedy or it may provide an administrative remedy and
make it exclusive, however mistaken its exercise."278
Another important class of "privilege" cases, which has recently
been before the Supreme Court, is that involving government contractors. In these cases, too, provisions for administrative conclusiveness are
interpreted by the courts so as completely to bar review. 279 The government contractor, like the applicant for a veterans' benefit, is seen to
have only the "privilege" of dealing with the government. He is placed
in a different position from that of the private citizen whose property or
personal "rights" are adversely affected by administrative action. Provisions for administrative conclusiveness will be given literal effect by
the courts in the contractor's case.
The fact that administrative conclusiveness is explainable legally
in these cases because a government contract is considered as a "privilege," not a "right," in this country, does not, however, mean that the
legal result is the desirable one. ". . . the rule we announce has wide
application and a devastating effect," asserted Justice Douglas, in dissenting from the Court's holding of administrative conclusiveness in
the most recent of the government contractor cases. "It make a tyrant
out of every contracting officer."280
It is unrealistic today to treat the applicant for a pension or government contract, whose financial well-being may be wholly dependent
upon the government grant, any differently from one said to be injured
in his personal or propery "rights." Insofar as the availability of judicial
review is concerned, is there, for example, adequate reason for differentiating the position of a veteran seeking a pension from that of an
275 54 Stat. L. 1197, §11 (1940), 38 U.S.C. (1946) §lla-2; 48 Stat. L. 9, §5, 38

u.s.c. (1946) §705.

276 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 at 587, 54 S.Ct. 840 (1934).
277Slocumb v. Gray, (D.C. Cir. 1949) 179 F. (2d) 31 at 34.
21s Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167 at 171, 56 S.Ct. 400 (1936).
210 United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 72 S.Ct. 154 (1951); Moorman v.
United States, 338 U.S. 457, 70 S.Ct. 288 (1950).
2so United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 at 101, 72 S.Ct. 154 (1951).
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alien being deported, simply because a veterans' benefit is termed a
privilege instead of a property right? Insofar as its effect upon the
individual is concerned, the veterans' pension case, regardless of the
tag used, involves a need for judicial control just as great as does any
administrative proceeding. And the same is true of other cases involving
the grant of so-called privileges or benefits by the state. The fact that
the state can deny such privileges altogether should not mean that
they can be denied by the administration to particular individuals,
without the latter being entitled to judicial decisions upon the legality
of .the administrative denials.

Availability of Review
Re-viewable action. Whether particular administrative action is
reviewable depends upon whether such action is "final." Agency action
is clearly not "final" in a given case if the private party has not complied
with the rule requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies. To
say that administrative remedies must be exhausted before recourse may
be had to the courts does not, however, of itself solve the problem of
whether particular agency action is "final" action subject to review. As
the Supreme Court has aptly pointed out in a related matter, 281 no selfenforcing formula defining when an order is final can be devised. The
considerations that determine finality are not abstractions but have
reference to very real interests-not merely those of the immediate
parties but, more particularly, those that pertain to the smooth functioning of the judicial system.282
In its famous opinion in Rochester Telephone Corporation v.
United States2 83 the Court referred to cases where the challenged
agency order did not in itself affect complainant, but only affected his
rights adversely on the contingency of future administrative action. In
view of traditional conceptions of federal judicial power, said the Court,
"resort to the courts in these situations is either premature or wholly
beyond their province."284 Yet, as the Court itself has recognized, there
have been instances where the courts have entertained review of an
order that might otherwise be deemed interlocutory, because the controversy had proceeded to a point where the losing party would be
irreparably injured if review were unavailable. 285
281 Whether a judgment was "6nal" within the meaning of §237 of the Judicial Code
(under the Revised Code of 1948, 28 U.S.C. §1257).
282 Republic Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62 at 67, 69, 68 S.Ct. 972 (1948).
2ss 307 U.S. 125, 59 S.Ct. 754 (1939).
ll84 Jd. at 130.
2s1> Republic Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62 at 68, 68 S.Ct. 972 (1948).
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In Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States,286 the appellant
sought review of the Chain Broadcasting Regulations promulgated by
the Federal Communications Commission. The regulations in question
provided that no licenses were to be granted to stations or applicants
having specified contractual relationships with broadcasting networks.
Appellant was a network organization whose business depended upon
the maintenance and renewal of contracts such as those against which
the instant regulations were directed. It was argued that the order
promulgating the regulations was not reviewable, for in and of themselves they did not purport to affect the contract rights of appellant or
its affiliate stations. They merely laid down principles to govern future
action of the Commission. Their effect was thus contingent upon
Federal Communications Commission action in future license application or renewal cases, and it was only when the Commission acted in
such a case in conformity to the regulations that its action was reviewable.
This argument was rejected by Chief Justice Stone, speaking for
the majority of the Court. It was unreal, said he, to assert that appellant
was not adversely affected by the order promulgating these regulations.
Such a claim loses sight of the immediate effect upon appellant's contractual relations with its affiliates. For knowledge that contracts such
as those they had with appellant would result in a refusal to re~ew
their station permits, would lead the affiliates to repudiate the contracts
rather than run the risk of losing their licenses. "If the regulations are
valid they alter the status of appellant's contracts and thus determine
their validity in advance of such [renewal] proceedings. By striking
them down by a determination proclaimed in advance that licenses shall
be cancelled or refused because of a previous failure to comply with the
regulations, they impose a penalty and sanction for noncompliance far
more drastic than the fines customarily inB.icted for breach of reviewable administrative orders."287
Appellant's rights were affected more immediately than by the mere
contingency of future administrative action. It is true that licensees
who regarded the regulations as invalid were free to continue their
existing contracts and to challenge the regulations when the Commission refused to renew their licenses and that the network could intervene in the renewal proceeding. But is it not more likely that there
would never be such a challenge by a licensee in a renewal proceeding,
for to make the challenge would be to chance losing its license? The
286 316 U.S. 407,
287Jd. at 418.

62 S.Ct. 1194 (1942).
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licensees were "free only in the sense that all those who do not choose
to conform to regulations which may be determined to be lawful are
free by their choice to accept the legal consequences of their acts. Failure to comply with the regulations entails such consequences to the
station owner and to appellant. These are the loss of the affiliated stations' licenses if they adhere to their contracts, and disruption of
appellant's network through the declared unlawfulness of the contracts,
if the regulations are valid."288
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 289 which has
already been discussed from the point of view of procedural due process,290 involved administrative action which, like that in the Columbia
Broadcasting System case, was claimed by the government to be, as yet,
unripe for review. In the Anti-Fascist Committee case, it will be recalled, plaintiff organizations sought injunctive relief against its designation by the Attorney General as subversive in a list furnished by him
to the Loyalty Review Board and disseminated by it to executive departments and agencies to guide them in employing and discharging employees. For the government, it was urged that the challenged administrative action did not, of itself, have any adverse effect upon plaintiff.
It might well be that there would ultimately be direct effect, but only
on the contingency of further administrative action. Thus, government
employees who were members in plaintiff organization might be discharged from employment solely because of their membership. It was
only then, it was argued, that there would be the direct adverse effect
which was necessary before administrative action could be challenged
in the courts.
This was essentially the argument which was made and rejected by
the Court in the Columbia Broadcasting System case. The similar
argument made in the Anti-Fascist Committee case was likewise rejected
by the majority of the Court. The basic weakness of the decision in
that case has already been touched upon. A separate opinion by each
of the five majority justices, each of whom approaches the issues from
his own individualistic point of view, can hardly help leaving the
student with much the same uncertainty that British observers have
felt after some of the decisions of the House of Lords in its more
expansive moments. ''What is the rule of the case?" is the natural
288 Id. at 419. The argument rejected by the Court in the Columbia Broadcasting
System case was made more successfully in Eccles v. People's Bank, 333 U.S. 426, 68
S.Ct. 641 (1948).
·289 341 U.S. 123, 71 S.Ct. 624 (1951).
290 Supra note 136.
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query of the common lawyer after an important decision. It is one
which cannot be answered with complete certainty after the AntiFascist Committee case. What is, however, clear from the result reached
in that case is that with regard to the immediate point with which we
are here concerned, that of the reviewability of the action of the
Attorney General and the Loyalty Review Board, all of the majority
justices decided in favor of reviewability.
Justice Reed, who dissented, adopted the argument of the government, which had been sustained by the lower courts. The challenged
administrative action, he asserted, does not directly affect the listed
organizations. "These petitioners are not ordered to do anything and
are not punished for anything." 291 But it has been recognized ever
since the Rochester Telephone case that the mere fact that administrative action does not affirmatively compel or forbid conduct on the part
of the person seeking review is not of itself conclusive upon the question of reviewability. Let there be direct adverse effect upon a legally
protected right and recourse to the courts is available. Here the right
of a bona fide charitable organization to carry on its work, free from
defamatory statements on the part of the administration,292 is a right
which the law will protect. And, as stated by Justice Burton, "It is
unrealistic to contend that because the respondents gave no orders
directly to the petitioners to change their course of conduct, relief
cannot be granted against what the respondents actually did. We long
have granted relief to parties whose legal rights have been violated by
unlawful public action, although such action made no direct demands
'
upon them."293
Standing. It is a basic principle of our administrative law that a
person seeking review must have a direct personal interest in the administrative action which he challenges before his review action will be
entertained. "A petitioner does not have standing to sue," as Justice
Frankfurter has recently expressed it, "unless he is 'interested in and
affected adversely by the decision' of which he seeks review. His
'interest must be of a personal and not of an official nature.' "294
291341 U.S. 123 at 203.
was, in essence, the allegation in the complaint, which must be taken as
admitted because of the government's motion to dismiss. See supra notes 131, 138.
293 341 U.S. 123 at 141, citing among other cases Columbia Broadcasting System v.
United States, supra note 286. It is interesting to note that Justice Frankfurter, who
had delivered the vigorous dissent in the Columbia Broadcasting case, concurred here,
and wrote a lengthy essay in favor of reviewability. Though he did not mention the
Columbia Broadcasting case, the problem involved is, as has been indicated, essentially
the same as in the instant case.
294 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 at 151.
292 This
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The simplest cases to deal with are those where the individual seeking review is adversely affected in his economic interest by the administrative decision which he challenges. In its decision in the well-known
Sanders case,295 the Supreme Court had extended the concept of direct
economic injury to petitioner to include the grant of a license to a rival
in a closely competitive field. The Sanders principle was applied by
the Court in 1943 in the KOA case,296 which has already been discussed
insofar as the right to be heard is concemed.297 In that case, respondent
station KOA challenged an order of the Federal Communications
Commission which granted an application for an increase in power
and for operation unlimited in time to a station operating on the same
frequency as respondent. The relevant statutory provision provided
for an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
such cases by an applicant whose application was refused or by "any
other person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected by any
decision of the Commission granting or refusing any such application."
The majority of the Court held that KOA had standing under this
provision. "It would be anomalous," declared Justice Roberts, "if one
entitled to be heard before the Commission should be denied the right
of appeal from an order made without hearing. . . . In view of the fact
that §312(b) grants KOA the right to become a party to the proceedings, we think it plain that it is a party aggrieved, or a party whose
interests will be adversely affected by the grant of WHDH's application ...."298 The holding of the majority of the Court in the KOA
case appears to follow logically from its Sanders decision. As Professor
Davis has pointed out, KOA's interest in freedom from electrical interference is at least as deserving of protection as Sanders' interest in
freedom from economic competition. 299
The Sanders-KOA type of case is comparatively easy to deal with.
l'vfore difficult are those where the person bringing the review action
relies upon injury not to himself as an individual alone, but to a larger
group or collectivity of which he is a member. Among these cases where
petitioner relies upon what may be termed a collective interest are those
where he alleges that he is a taxpayer, whose interest arises from the
fact that the administrative act which he challenges as illegal involves
295 Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309
U.S. 470, 60 S.Ct. 693 (1940).
296 Federal Communications Commission v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S.
239, 63 S.Ct. 1035 (1943).
297 Supra note 156.
298 319 U.S. 239 at 246-247.
299 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 699 (1951).
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an expenditure of public funds. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 300 the
Supreme Court held that one alleging only the interest of a taxpayer
·did not have the standing necessary to bring a review action. This
principle has been followed in more recent cases301 and appears to be
firmly settled in federal jurisprudence. It should be compared with
the situation in many of the states, where so-called "taxpayers' suits"
are more freely allowed.
Closely related to the taxpayer cases are those where the individual
bringing the review action relies upon his interest as a consumer using
the product or service which is regulated or operated by the administration. In these cases, as in those involving taxpayer's suits, the petitioner is a member of a group or collectivity which is affected by the
administrative action, and his suit, if successful, vindicates not only his
personal interest, but, even more so, the collective interest of the group
to which he belongs.
The Supreme Court has been most reluctant to allow suits by individuals alleging only the interest of a consumer. An outstanding
example of the Court's attitude is to be found in City of Atlanta v.
Ickes.302 As explained by Justice Frankfurter in a later case, that case
stands for the proposition that a consumer has no standing to challenge
a minimum price order. 303 And what is true of minimum price orders
has also been true of orders fixing public utility rates in the jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court.304
More recent federal cases appear, however, to take a more friendly
attitude toward the standing of consumers.305 Particularly significant is
a well-reasoned opinion by Judge Frank in a 1943 case306 upholding
the standing of a consumer to challenge a minimum-price order. It is
true that this change in attitude has not, as yet, been articulated in any
Supreme Court decisions. 307 Yet the recent lower court decisions which
800 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597 (1923).
Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 72 S.Ct. 394 (1952); Clement
Martin v. Dick Corp., (D.C. Pa. 1951) 97 F. Supp. 961.
802 308 U.S. 517, 60 S.Ct. 170 (1939), affirming (D.C. D.C. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 606.
so3 Dissenting, in Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 at 319, 64 S.Ct. 559 (1944).
304 Wright v. Central Ky. Gas. Co., 297 U.S. 537, 56 S.Ct. 578 (1936); City
of New York v. New York Tel. Co., 261 U.S. 312, 43 S.Ct. 372 (1923).
305 E.g., National Coal Assn. v. Federal Power Commission, (D.C. Cir. 1951) 191 F.
(2d) 462; United States v. Public Utilities Commission, (D.C. Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 609.
306 Associated Industries v. Ickes, (2d Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 694.
807In Parker v. Fleming, 329 U.S. 531, 67 S.Ct. 463 (1947), the standing of a
tenant to seek review of an order of the Price Administrator authorizing his landlord
to begin eviction proceedings was upheld. And, in Public Utilities Commission v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 72 S.Ct. 813 (1952), the standing of a consumer was implicitly
upheld.
301
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allow review -actions to be brought by consumers appear to have more
to commend them than the contrary jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court. It is difficult to see why a consumer does not have a direct personal interest in administrative action which affects the product or
service which he purchases. If the price which he has to pay is increased
by administrative order, is it not unreal to hold that he does not have a
personal interest in having the order in question reviewed?
The administrative law case-law in this country has, as has been
indicated, recognized that the economic interest of a competitor is
sufficient to allow him to bring a review action. If that is true of a
competitor, why is it not also true of a consumer whose economic wellbeing may also be wholly dependent upon the service which he uses,
especially in the field of public utilities? The answer which the
Supreme Court has sometimes given,308 that in cases of this type there
are only two parties involved, the administrative agency and the company which is being regulated, simply does not square with the facts.
It rests upon the proposition that the consuming public is adequately
represented by the administration, which can be wholly relied upon to
defend the public interest-a proposition which may often be, at best, a
pious fiction in these cases.
In cases of the type under discussion, unless a consumer is permitted
to challenge the administrative action, it is unlikely that the legality of
such action will ever be reviewed. In a practical sense, then, such action
would be placed in a conclusive position, for it would never be challenged by the only other parties involved, the agency and the company
regulated by it. If the administrative action is beneficial to the company-such as an order raising the price of its product or services-it is
only the consumer who is adversely affected and who will seek to
challenge its validity.
In view of the role of the courts in enforcing the principle of
administrative legality, it is of the utmost importance that agency action
should not be placed in a position of conclusiveness. In these cases,
review should be made available at the suit of the consumer, the one
party who may have an interest in challenging the administrative action.
As stated by the Court in the Sanders case, with regard to the standing
of one injured economically by the grant of a license to a competitor,
"Congress had some purpose in enacting §402(b)(2). It may have
been of opinion that one likely to be financially injured by the issue of
a license would be the only person having a sufficient interest to bring
sos Smith v. lliinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587 at 592, 46 S.Ct. 408 (1926). See,
similarly, Stuyvesant Town Corp. v. lmpellitteri, 113 N.Y.S. (2d) 593 (1952).
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to the attention of the appellate court errors of law in the action of the
Commission in granting the license. "309
Scope of Review
Questions of fact. The minority of the Attorney General's Committee sharply criticized what it termed one of the prevalent interpretations of the "substantial evidence" rule. "Under this interpretation,
if what is called 'substantial evidence' is found anywhere in the record
to support conclusions of fact, the courts are said to be obliged to sustain the decision without reference to how heavily the countervailing
evidence may preponderate-unless indeed the stage of arbitrary decision is reached. Under this interpretation, the courts need to read only
one side of the case and, if they find any evidence there, the administrative action is to be sustained and the record to the contrary is to be
ignored."310 By 1942, it had become apparent that this interpretation
had been adopted by the Supreme Court. "[I]f the findings of the
Board are supported by evidence," asserted that tribunal in the Nevada
Consolidated Copper case, "the courts are not free to set them aside,
even though the Board could have drawn different inferences."311
Where the Court could not say that "the findings of fact of the Board
are without support in the evidence,"312 its findings had to be upheld.
As it has recently been expressed by Justice Frankfurter, with regard
to review of the National Labor Relations Board, "It is fair to say that
by imperceptible steps regard for the fact-finding function of the Board
led to the assumption that the requirements of the Wagner Act were
met when the reviewing court could find in the record evidence which,
when viewed in isolation, substantiated the Board's findings." 313
It was dissatisfaction with this restricted scope of review, as much
as anything else, which led to the Administrative Procedure Act and
the 1947 amendments to the Labor Relations Act. Those statutes
contain an express direction to reviewing courts to consider the "whole
record" in reaching their determination of whether administrative findings have the required substantial evidentiary support. Despite this,
809 Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309
U.S. 470 at 477, 60 S.Ct. 693 (1940).
s10 lli!PORT oF THB ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CoMMITTBll 210-211.
811 National Labor Relations Board v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Co., 316 U.S.
105 at 107, 62 S.Ct. 960 (1942).
812 Jbid.
8l8 Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474 at
478, 71 S.Ct. 456 (1951).
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most federal courts had held prior to 1951, that the scope of review
remained substantially what it had been before the enactment of the
two statutes.314 Though Congress may have intended to broaden the
scope of NLRB orders, a federal judge stated in 1950: "If it had such
an intent, it failed in the result. . .. So far as review is concerned, this
leaves us in the same status as before the amendments."315
In 1951, however, the Supreme Court, in two opinions -rendered
by Justice Frankfurter,316 unanimously upheld the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, which alone among the courts of appeals, had held
that the courts' reviewing power had been materially broadened by the
Administrative Procedure Act and the 1947 amendments to the Wagner
Act.317 The change in the scope of review, said the Court, has been
brought about by the insertion in both statutes of the specific direction
to the reviewing court to base its decision upon review of the "whole
record."
It has been urged by some that this "whole record" provision did no
more than to make express what had previously been implicit in the
federal theory of review. According to them the "substantial evidence"
test, as it had been applied by the federal courts, already required the
courts to search for substantiality of supporting evidence in the light of
the record considered as a whole. As expressed by Professor Jaffe,
"Obviously responsible men would not exercise their judgment on only
that part of the evidence that looks in one direction."318 For the test
of substantiality to be applied properly, a finding can be evaluated only
in the light of the whole fact situation.
Few will deny that Professor Jaffe's approach is the way ,in which
the "substantial evidence" test ought to be applied. At the same time,
as has been shown, it cannot be gainsaid that some of the federal courts
had given the impression that they were not applying the test in that
way. It may be, as one commentator has asserted, that "the notion that
a reviewing court should ignore all the evidence on one side has so
little to commend it that many will find surprising the Court's serious
treatment of that possibility."319 Still, it cannot be denied, as Professor
814 Id. at 476, note 1, for cases in the various circuits.
815National Labor Relations Board v. Continental Oil Co., (10th Cir. 1950) 179
F. (2d) 552 at 555.
816Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 71
S.Ct. 456 (1951); National Labor Relations Board v. Pittsburgh S. S. Co., 340 U.S.
498, 71 S.Ct. 453 (1951).
317Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (6th Cir. 1950) 180 F.
(2d) 731.
81 8 Jaffe, "Judicial Review: 'Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record,'" 64 HARv.
L. RBv. 1233 at 1235 (1951).
819 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 872, note 22 (1951).
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Jaffe, speaking for those who felt that the courts had always been applying the "substantial evidence" test in the light of the whole record, has
conceded, that in the Universal Camera and Pittsburgh S.S. cases, "the
Supreme Court B.atly gave the lie to our pious assumptions."320 As it
was put during the oral argument by Justice Frankfurter, who presumably knows better than even the most acute outside observer just what
he had been doing in cases involving review of administrative action,
the "substantial evidence" test "means if I :find something in the evidence which supports it [i.e., the administrative :finding], my case is at
an end. That is what I thought I had been doing." 321
If the opinions of the Court in the Universal Camera and Pittsburgh S.S. cases mean anything, they mean that the courts on review
can no longer approach cases the way Justice Frankfurter states that
he did. In the words of the Universal Camera opinion, 'Whether or
not it was ever permissible for courts to determine the substantiality of
evidence supporting a Labor Board decision merely on the basis of
evidence which in and of itself justified it, without taking into account
contradictory evidence or evidence from which conB.icting inferences
could be drawn, the new legislation de:6.nitively precludes such a theory
of review and bars its practice. The substantiality of evidence must
take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.
This is clearly the significance of the requirement in both statutes that
courts consider the whole record." 322
One would have to be singularly naive to conclude that the Universal Camera case lays down a mathematically clear guide to reviewing courts. Justice Frankfurter himself concedes that he is not stating
a formula for review that assures complete certainty of application.
"The difficulty is that we cannot escape, in relation to this problem, the
use of unde:6.ned defining terms."323 All that one can say with certainty
is that the Court has given a green light to the federal courts to apply
a wider theory of review, but exactly how much wider review is to be
remains to be seen.
That the scope of review has, in fact, been broadened since the
Universal Camera case is to be seen from several lower court decisions.
According to Judge Learned Hand, upon remand of the Universal
Camera case, the Supreme Court intended to prescribe an attitude in
320 Jaffe, "Judicial Review: 'Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record,'" 64 HARv.
L. REv. 1233 at 1235 (1951).
821 Id. at 1236, quoting from argument, p. 32, National Labor Relations Board v.
Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 340 U.S. 498, 71 S.Ct. 453 (1951).
822 340 U.S. 474 at 487.
823 Id. at 489.
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courts of appeal less complaisant toward administrative :findings than
had been proper before; not only were they to look to the record as a
whole, but they were to be less ready to yield their personal judgment
on the facts. On issues on which the specialized experience of the
administrative agency does not equip it "with major premises inaccessible to judges," the courts are to be deemed as competent as the agency
to pass upon issues of fact. In the instant case Judge Hand stated that
all the issues at bar were of this type, and the court could not therefore
accept the Board's argument that "we are not in as good a position as
itself to decide what witnesses were more likely to be telling the truth
in this labor dispute." 324 If Judge Hand is correct on this, then the
scope of review has, indeed, been broadened, for it had previously been
settled that questions of credibility were for the administrative agency,
not the courts.
The views of the lower federal courts on this point are of great
importance in view of the fact that Justice Frankfurter indicated in the
Pittsburgh S.S. case that theirs was henceforth to be the primary role in
the :field of judicial review. In that case, said Justice Frankfurter, were
he called to pass upon the administrative :findings in the :first instance
or to make an independent review of the review by the court of appeals,
he might well support the Board's conclusion and reject that of the
court below. But Congress has charged the courts of appeals, not the
Supreme Court, with the normal and primary responsibility of review.
This is not the place to review a conllict of evidence nor to reverse the
court of appeals because "were we in its place we would :find the record
tilting one way rather than the other, though fair-minded judges could
:find it tilting either way."325 Or, to put it another way, henceforth the
same degree of :finality that is accorded to administrative :findings by
the court of appeals will be accorded to the determinations of such
courts on review by the Supreme Court.
Application of law to fact. A leading authority on statutory interpretation has divided the steps in the judicial process of interpreting
statutes into three parts: (1) :finding or choosing the proper statute or
statutes applicable; (2) interpreting the statute law in its technical
sense; (3) applying the meaning so found to the case at hand. 326 On
324 National Labor Relations Board v. Universal Camera Corp., (2d Cir. 1951)
190 F. (2d) 429 at 430.
325 National Labor Relations Board v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 340 U.S. 498 at 503,
71 S.Ct. 453 (1951).
326 De Sloovere, "Steps in the Process of Interpreting Statutes," 10 N.Y. Umv. L.Q.
REv. 1 (1932).

1953]

ADMINISTRATIVE

LAw: 1942-1951

855

the other hand, it has been urged that the interpretation and application of statutes are two different things. In this view, interpretation
properly so called includes only the determination of the proper sensible
meaning of the statute. Application is the process of determining
whether the facts of the particular case are within or without that
meaning.827
The Supreme Court has been giving ever increasing indication
that it is in accord with the second of these views on the meaning of
statutory interpretation, at least insofar as the judicial role in reviewing
administration action is concerned. "Most frequently, particularly in
recent years in the administrative law field, the problem has arisen in
connection with the application of statutory language to particular
states of fact." 328 In Gray v. Powell,329 the Supreme Court had implied
that the application of statutory terms or concepts to particular states of
fact was to be treated more like a question of fact than one of law, for
the purpose of determining the proper scope of review.
During the past decade, the Supreme Court has applied the doctrine
of Gray v. Powell in a large number of cas~ and it now appears to be
firmly ingrained in federal law.330 As good a case as any to illustrate
this is National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Puhlications, 331 where
the Board's determination that certain newsboys were its "employees"
was challenged by the employer. According to Justice Roberts, who
dissented, "The question who is an employee, so as to make the statute
applicable to him, is a question of the meaning of the act and, therefore,
is a judicial and not an administrative question." 332 Hence, it was one
to be determined by the reviewing court upon its own independent
judgment. To the majority of the Court, however, the proper scope of
review was a more restricted one. "... where the question," stated
Justice Rutledge, "is one of specific application of a broad statutory
term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute
must determine it initially, the reviewing court's function is limited....
the Board's determination that specified persons are 'employees' under
this act is to be accepted if it has 'warrant in the record' and a reason327Jd. at 17.
328 Stern, "Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative
Analysis," 58 HARv. L. Irnv. 70 at 94 (1944).
329 314 U.S. 402, 62 S.Ct. 326 (1941).
330 See cases listed in SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN A»MINisTRAnvB LAw 121 (1950).
381322 U.S. lll, 64 S.Ct. 851 (1944).
832 Id. at 136.
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able basis in law."333 Reasonableness rather than rightness has thus
become the test upon review of this type of question. 334
Nor, it should be noted, is the doctrine of Gray v. Powell affected
by the review provisions of the federal Administrative Procedure Act.
What the Supreme Court giveth, it can also take away. Just when the
Universal Camera and Pittsburgh S.S. cases335 have led one to believe
that the Court was on the verge of drastically broadening the scope of
review, one comes -µpon O'Leary v. Brown-Paci-fie-Maxon, Inc.,886
decided the same day. That case involved an award made under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The employer maintained for its employees a recreation center adjoining a
channel so dangerous that swimming was forbidden and signs to that
effect erected. After spending the afternoon at the center, an employee
was drowned while attempting to swim the channel in order to rescue
two men in distress. The deputy commissioner found as a "fact" that
the employee's death arose out of and in the course of his employment
and awarded a death benefit to his mother.
The award was sustained by a divided Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice Frankfurter, on the ground that the finding was supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole
under the principle of the Universal Camera case. The finding at issue
was thus treated as a finding of fact by the Court, whose review was
governed by the "substantial evidence" rule. Yet, as Justice Frankfurter
himself recognizes, this is clearly not what one normally thinks of as
a finding of fact. 337 It is, as Justice Murphy once pointed out, a finding
which is more legal than factual in nature.888 The characterization of
it as "fact" by Justice Frankfurter, with the resultant narrowing in the
scope of review, led Justice Minton, who dissented, to assert, "I suppose
the way to avoid what we said today in Universal Camera Corp. v.
Labor Board ... is to find facts where there are no facts, on the whole
record or any piece of it."389
The finding at issue in the Brown-Paci-fie-Maxon case is one which,
in reality is neither solely one of law nor one of fact. It involves the
application of a statutory concept-"arising out of and in the course of
employment"-to a particular factual situation, i.e., the application of
888 Id. at 131.
SM DAvxs, ADMINISTRATIVE I.Aw 883 (1951).
385 Supra note 316.
886 340 U.S. 504, 71 S.Ct. 470 (1951).
887 Id. at 507.
888 Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S.
889 340 U.S. 504 at 510.

469 at 478, 67 S.Ct. 801 (1947).

1953]

ADMINISTRATIVE

LAw: 1942-1951

857

law to fact. Under Gray v. Powell and the line of cases following it,
as we have seen, the scope of review of findings of this type is a limited
one, patterned upon the narrow review which is available over findings
of pure fact. It must be admitted that under the principle of Gray v.
Powell the rule that questions of statutory construction are for the courts
on review loses much of its force. This is true even though, strictly
speaking, the finding at issue in this type of case involves only the
application of a statutory term to a particular state of fact. As Justice
Frankfurter, himself, has aptly pointed out, "Meaning derives vitality
from application. Meaning is easily thwarted or distorted by misapplication."340
It has been argued by some that the doctrine of Gray v. Powell has
been done away with by the portion of section IO of the Administrative
Procedure Act which provides that the "reviewing court shall decide all
relevant questions of law."341 Under their view, a £nding like that at
issue in the Brown-Paci-fie-Maxon case, which involves a question of
statutory interpretation, is primarily one of law and, hence, one which
is to be determined by the reviewing court itself under section IO of
the Administrative Procedure Act. However sound this view may be,
it should be emphasized that it has not been followed by the Court in
the Brown-Paci-fie-Maxon case. If section IO of the Administrative
Procedure Act were in fact intended by its sponsors to alter the doctrine
of Gray v. Powell, that intent has been defeated by the convenient
labelling by the Court of the finding at issue in the Brown-Paci-ficMaxon case as one of "fact."342
Jurisdictional fact. The finding at issue in the Gray v. Powell type
of case is not only a finding involving a question of statutory interpretation, but is also a finding of "jurisdictional fact" in the sense that its
presence is a condition precedent to the lawful exercise of administra840 Trust

of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 at 380, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945).
See Schwartz, ''Mixed Questions of Law and Fact and the Administrative Procedure
Act," 19 FoRDHAM L. REv. 73 (1950).
842 In many of the states, findings of the type just discussed are fully reviewed. See
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 873 (1951). Some recent state decisions are Alabama
Public Service Commission v. Higginbotham, 256 Ala. 621, 56 S. (2d) 401 (1951);
American Stevedore Co. v. Industrial Commission, 408 ill. 449, 97 N.E. (2d) 325 (1951);
Williams Construction Co. v. Bohlen, 189 Md. 576, 56 A. (2d) 694 (1948); Cooper
v. Colonial Ice Co., 230 N.C. 43, 51 S.E. (2d) 889 (1949); Vaughan v. Shell Pipe
Line Corp., 204 Okla. 175, 228 P. (2d) 180 (1951); Combs v. Cole Bros. Circus, 165
Pa. Super 346, 67 A. (2d) 791 (1949); Younginer v. Jones Construction Co., 215 S.C.
135, 54 S.E. (2d) 545 (1949); Brown v. Fox, 189 Va. 509, 54 S.E. (2d) 109 (1949);
West Shore Transit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 258 Wis. 477, 46 N.W. (2d) 203
(1951). The conflicting views are well summed up in the dissenting opinion in Gentry
v. Industrial Commission, 202 Okla. 75 at 77, 210 P. (2d) 160 (1948).
841
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tive authority. Thus, in Gray v. Powell itself, the agency power to
act was dependent upon the finding that the private party was not a
"producer-consumer" within the exemption provisions of the enabling
act, for the statutory price-fixing scheme was not operative in the
absence of such a Ending. To apply the normal theory of limited review
to such a case, it can be argued, would run counter to the general policy
of Anglo-American law against allowing inferior tribunals to make a
final determination as to their own jurisdiction. "An agency may not
finally decide the limits of its statutory power," the Supreme Court has
asserted. "That is a judicial function." 343 Where the administrative
jurisdiction depends upon a particular finding, the reviewing court
should be able to determine for itself whether that finding is correct,
even though the Ending happens to be one of fact.
The Supreme Court has indicated, during the past decade, that it
is wholly out of sympathy with attempts to secure broad review based
upon this "jurisdictional fact" doctrine. As it has been put by Justice
Frankfurter, "Analysis is not furthered by speaking of such findings
as 'jurisdictional' and not even when- to adapt a famous phrase-jurisdictional is softened by a quasi. 'Jurisdiction' competes with 'right'
as one of the most deceptive of legal pitfalls. The opinions in Crowell
v. Benson ... and the casuistries to which they have given rise bear
unedifying testimony of the morass into which one is led in working
out problems of judicial review over administrative decisions by loose
talk about jurisdiction."344
According to the same Justice, in another opinion, the doctrine
enunciated by Crowell v. Benson,3415 that jurisdictional facts must be
fully reviewed, has now "earned a deserved repose." 346 Recent lower
court decisions indicate, however, that the learned judge was somewhat
premature in his diagnosis. The doctrine of Crowell v. Benson has
been consistently applied by the lower federal courts in cases arising
under the Longshoremen's Act involving the facts declared by the
Supreme Court to be "jurisdictional" in that case, i.e., the facts of
locality of injury and/or employment.347 At the same time, the recent
cases have strictly limited the doctrine of Crowell v. Benson to the two
"fundamental" facts expressly named in that case. As recently put by
343 Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 at 369, 66 S.Ct. 637 (1946).
344 Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685 at 695, 64 S.Ct. 327 (1944).
345 285 U.S. 22, 52 S.Ct. 285 (1932).
846 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 at 142, 66 S.Ct. 423 (1946).
84'1 See cases cited in Schwartz, ''Does the Ghost of Crowell 11. Benson Still Walk'?" 98

Umv. PA. L. Rav. 163 at 174, note 53 (1949).
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Circuit Judge Frank, "that doctrine strictly limits the category of jurisdictional questions."348 Beyond this, the lower federal courts have been
unable to go. There may be no logical reason for differentiating the
fact of employment from other "statutory-jurisdictional" facts under the
Longshoremen's Act. But there is still the authority of Crowell 11.
Benson for such differentiation-and that case has never been expressly
overruled by the Supreme Court. The present status of Crowell 11.
Benson in cases under the Longshoremen's Act is thus that stated by a
district judge who admitted that he was "in full accord with the
dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis" in Crowell 11. Benson. "But
unless and until the decision is overruled by the Supreme Court, it is
controlling upon me. . . . While [later] decisions indicate that the
Supreme Court has no intention of extending the doctrine of 'jurisdictional fact' and while they may indeed presage the overruling of Crowell
v. Benson, they do not go far enough to warrant me in refusing to
consider as 'jurisdictional facts' the exact facts which the Supreme
Court in that case held to be such."349
Constitutional fact. The doctrine of "constitutional fact" articulated in Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough350 is the logical
fulfillment of the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine, for, in this country, the
ultimate limits to the lawful exercise of any power are those contained
in the organic instrument. Whenever a constitutional issue is raised,
said the Court in the Ben Avon case, a fair opportunity must be provided "for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for determination
upon its own independent judgment as to both law and facts; otherwise
the order is void because in conllict with the due process clause...."351
To vest the administrative finding here with finality would be to allow
the administrative body itself to find the facts upon which the constitutional exercise of its authority depends.
In 1942, one of the hotly-contested issues in administrative law
concerned the extent to which the Ben Avon case was still good law.
Many observers saw in the Rowan & Nichols Oil cases,352 which had
just been decided, a clear indication that the Court would no longer
follow Ben Avon. Yet the Ben Avon doctrine was nowhere directly
mentioned in Rowan & Nichols. Hence, there ~as room for argument
348 Seaboard Marine Repair Co. v. Cardillo,
849 Tucker v. Norton, (D.C. Pa. 1943) 49

(2d Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 431 at 432.
F. Supp. 483 at 484. On the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine in state courts, see cases cited supra note 342.
850 253 U.S. 287, 40 S.Ct. 527 (1920).
851 Id. at 289.
852 Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 60 S.Ct.
1021 (1940), as amended, 311 U.S. 614 (1940); 311 U.S. 570, 61 S.Ct. 343 (1941).
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as to whether the Rowan & Nichols cases presaged a general overruling
of Ben Avon or whether they were to be limited to their particular field
of oil proration.
During the past decade, little additional light has been thrown
upon this question by the Supreme Court. The Ben Avon doctrine
has neither been expressly approved nor disapproved by our highest
tribunal in that time. Perhaps the clearest indication of the Court's
present feeling on the matter is to be found in a 1951 case. In Alabama
Public Service Commission v. Southern Ry. Co.,sr,s the district court
had followed the Ben Avon doctrine and heard evidence de nova. The
Supreme Court, in reversing, did not deal directly with the question
of the application of that doctrine. In the course of his opinion, the
Chief Justice did, however, state: "Whatever the scope of review of
Commission findings when an alleged denial of constitutional rights
is in issue, it is now settled that a utility has no right to relitigate factual
questions on the ground that constitutional rights are involved."354
This certainly would seem to imply that the Ben Avon doctrine is no
longer law.sr,r,
·
It should, however, be noted that the Ben Avon doctrine has been
applied by several lower federal courts in recent years.3r, 6 Of even
more significance, perhaps, is the adoption of Ben Avon by a number
of state courts, including the highest courts of New York and Massachusetts.357 The latter court has indeed gone so far as to state that a
legislative attempt to bar the Ben Avon doctrine would be unconstitutional.3r,8 These cases show that Ben Avon is still showing remarkable
vitality for a supposedly defunct doctrine. Referring to Ben Avon and
its reaffirmation in the St. Joseph359 case, the Massachusetts court has
recently stated, "Notwithstanding the criticism of these two Supreme
Court decisions, and notwithstanding assertions from various apparently
competent sources that they are no longer law, we have not been able
353 341

U.S. 341, 71 S.Ct. 762 (1951).

354 Id. at 348.
355Yet it should be pointed out that one of the members of the Court, who has, in
the past, appeared to be most .hostile to Ben Avon, Justice Frankfurter, has cited that
case, without any indication of disapproval, both in dissent in the Alabama Power Commission case, 341 U.S. 341 at 362, and in another recent case, Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 at 165 (1951).
356 Pichotta v. Skagway, (D.C. Alaska 1948) 78 F. Supp. 999; Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, (D.C. S.C. 1948) 77 F. Supp. 675.
3r,7 Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Maltbie, 296 N.Y. 374, 73 N.E. (2d) 705 (1947);
Lowell Gas Co. v. Dept. of Public Utilities, 324 Mass. 80, 84 N.E. (2d) 811 (1949).
358 Opinion of the Justices, (Mass. 1952) 106 N.E. (2d) 259.
359 St.

Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 56 S.Ct. 720 (1936).
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to discover when and where they have been overruled. One writer
announces that the doctrine of these cases has 'gradually died' because
of subsequent decisions inconsistent with it. . . . Perhaps so, but we
would prefer to see the death certificate."360

Conclusion

The history of American administrative law has been one of the
constant expansion of administrative authority accompanied by a correlative restriction of judicial power. It cannot be denied that the past
ten years have seen an accentuation of this development, insofar as the
courts alone have been concerned. The doctrine against uncanalized
delegations of authority to the administration has been all but done
away with in the federal field. Judicial restraints upon investigatory
power have been relaxed. The attempt of the Supreme Court to control the process of administrative decision by the principles laid down
in the first two Morgan cases,361 has proved a futile one. The primary
jurisdiction of the administration has been confirmed, even in cases
where the remedy sought can be obtained only in the courts. The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has been applied,
even where the very constitutional power of the agency to act was
challenged. Judicial review has been held barred even where there
has been no express preclusion by the legislature. The scope of review,
especially in the federal courts, has continued to be a narrow one.
Review of fact findings continues to be dominated by the "substantial
evidence" rule. And the area of "law" subject to full review has been
drastically narrowed. So-called "mixed findings of law and fact" are
assimilated to findings of fact, for purposes of review, under the doctrine of Gray v. Powell.362 The doctrines of "jurisdictional fact" and
"constitutional fact" appear to have been all but abandoned by the
federal courts, though they continue to persist in many of the states.
The balance-sheet of the past decade has not, however, been all in
favor of the administration. The federal Administrative Procedure Act
and its state counterparts give clear evidence of a legislative desire to
call a halt to the process of administrative expansion. And, significantly
enough, the courts have given every indication that such laws will be
interpreted in such a way as to give full effect to their remedial intent.
860 Opinion of
861 Supra note
862 Supra note

the Justices, (Mass. 1952) 106 N.E. (2d) 259 at 262.
205.
329.
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The Supreme Court decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act
have been of especial significance in this respect. While the present
Court is undoubtedly far more friendly toward administrative authority
than were its predecessors, it has shown by its recent decisions that it
is far from willing wholly to surrender the field to the administrator.
In strictly holding the exercise of administrative functions to the procedural level required by the Administrative Procedure Act and in
broadening the scope of review of findings of fact-albeit it is still a
narrow one--the Court has indicated that it still has a vital role to play.
The decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act may well
prove to be the most important rendered by our highest Court during
the past decade. For they appear to indicate a judicial concurrence in
the widely expressed desire to put an end to the growth of administrative authority and to re-establish judicial review as a true balance of
our governmental system. "How to fit ancient liberties, which have
gained a new preciousness, into solution of those exigent and intricate
economic problems that have been too long avoided rather than faced,
is the special task of Administrative Law," wrote a member of the
Supreme Court in 1941.363 Few would deny that that task is still in
large measure with us. For those of us in the common-law world,
indeed, the problem has become an even more difficult one. For we
have come to realize that abdication of the field to the administrator
will not lead to a solution. "It will not do to say that it all must be left
to the skill of experts."364 The judiciary, too, has a prominent part to
perform. "Courts no less than administrative bodies," the Supreme
Court stated significantly ten years ago, "are agencies of government.
Both are instruments for realizing public purposes."365
863Frankfurter, Foreword, 41 CoL. L. REv. 585 at 586 (1941).
864 Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 at 627, 64
S.Ct. 281 (1944).
365 Scripps-Howard Radio v. Federal Communications Commission, 316 U.S. 4 at 15,
62 S.Ct. 875 (1942J.

